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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyzes the direct and indirect income effects of international labor 
migration and remittances in selected CIS countries. The analysis is based on 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. All net emigration countries would experience a sharp 
contraction of private consumption in the absence of remittances. In Russia, the 
main effect of immigration has been to hold down the real wage (as potential capi-
tal stock adjustments in response to immigration are not reflected in our compara-
tive-static modeling framework). The paper concludes that because of the impor-
tant contribution of migration and remittances to stabilizing and sustaining in-
comes in many CIS countries, enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration 
should figure prominently in any deepening of bilateral relations between CIS 
countries and the European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
In many member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
international labor migration and remittances received by relatives at home now 
play a large role in financing private consumption and in shaping the labor supply 
and education decisions of households. Remittances received range from 8 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in Ukraine to more than 30 percent in Moldova 
according to the latest internationally comparable estimates (see Section 2 for de-
tails). 
At the same time, migration and remittances matter not only at the level of in-
dividual households. The large size of remittances suggests that they have proba-
bly affected output and income distribution not only directly at the level of remit-
tance-receiving households, but also through general-equilibrium or indirect chan-
nels. For example, in many CIS countries, a large share of government revenues 
derives from taxes on imports (especially VAT), which grew rapidly as a result of 
growing remittance inflows. With higher revenues, governments were able to 
maintain and expand social transfers so that transfer-receiving households may 
have benefited indirectly from migration and remittances although they received 
no remittances of their own. Furthermore, the growth of remittances since ap-
proximately the year 2000 has coincided in most CIS countries with the recovery 
of GDP from its transition-induced precipitous fall during the 1990s. This coinci-
dence of remittances and GDP growth raises the question of how labor migration 
and remittances may have contributed to the economic recovery in most CIS coun-
tries since 2000. 
This paper presents case studies for several CIS countries that seek to assess 
the indirect effects of labor migration and remittances on income distribution and 
structural change systematically. The case studies are based on single country 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. While the direct impact of migra-
tion and remittances at the household level has been studied through household-
level analyses in many countries, much less work has been done on indirect (or 
general equilibrium) effects. The case studies cover several net emigration coun-
tries – Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan – as well as Russia, which has 
recently experienced both emigration and immigration. 
Section 2 describes the overall macroeconomic context in which the sharp in-
crease in labor migration and remittances since approximately the year 2000 oc-
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curred. In terms of the main categories of macroeconomic demand, household 
final consumption has grown more strongly than GDP since 2000 in the five sam-
ple countries. By contrast, the evolution of government consumption was rather 
diverse. Fixed capital formation only began to grow with a lag of several years 
after the pickup in GDP in most countries, although the transition-induced fall had 
reduced fixed investment to a level insufficient to prevent a gradual depletion of 
the existing capital stock. This overall picture is consistent with a view of GDP 
growth as initially driven from the demand side, with households’ disposable in-
comes growing because of remittances, a subsequent real appreciation and expan-
sion of non-tradable sectors, and a late response from investment. 
Section 3 presents the case studies on net emigration countries. Section 3.1 
contains a brief technical description of the standard IFPRI CGE model that is 
used in all country studies. Section 3.2 describes the case study for Moldova 
where the best available estimates suggest that remittances reached one third of 
GDP in 2006 while the number of migrants abroad amounted to about one quarter 
of the working population (including migrants). These estimates count only those 
migrants who are still part of a household in Moldova (i.e. contribute to household 
income and share in expenditures); remittances may include transfers from indi-
viduals who have left Moldova permanently. Labor migration from Moldova is 
remarkable in that poorer households are more likely to send a migrant abroad 
than richer ones, contrary to the situation in many other countries where barriers to 
emigration are more difficult to overcome for poor, credit-constrained households. 
In the case of Moldova, the poor and low-skilled have the option of taking up em-
ployment in Russia, where travel is visa-free and cheap, although working condi-
tions and wages are often poor. By contrast, the EU (especially Italy and Portugal) 
would be preferred as a host country by many migrants because of better pay and 
conditions, but high up-front costs for illegal travel make this a difficult proposi-
tion for many poor households. 
Our simulation results suggest all household groups in Moldova would lose 
substantially in the absence of migration and remittances. In relative terms, the 
losses would be largest for small farmers because (i) migration, including for sea-
sonal work, is very widespread in the countryside, and (ii) higher disposable in-
comes in the population at large are strengthening demand for local food products. 
As expected, private consumption would be one third lower, with a smaller reduc-
tion in GDP of approximately one tenth. The only sector that would gain signifi-
cantly is light industry, mostly through much higher exports; this simulation result 
is in line with a conventional Dutch disease effect. 
In Ukraine (Section 3.3), remittances are rather smaller in relation to GDP than 
in the three smaller CIS countries with net emigration. Plausible estimates put 
remittances in the order of one tenth of GDP and the number of labor migrants 
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substantially below one tenth of the labor force. Still, our CGE-based simulations 
reveal quite notable effects of migration and remittances. For example, the coun-
try’s hypothetical economy would have lost up to 7% of its potential without mi-
gration and remittance-induced effects. All types of households benefit from re-
mittances substantially: their overall consumption would have been lower by 14 to 
21 percent in the hypothetical “migration and remittance free” economy. Rich 
urban households are set to win the most, while households with income coming 
mostly in form of government transfers gain the least from remittances and their 
economy-wide effects. On production side, light and food industry are the key 
beneficiaries of remittance-driven demand effects. On the other hand, local ma-
chinery, construction and public administration sectors appear to be quite remit-
tance-neutral. 
In Georgia (Section 3.4), labor migration apparently started earlier than else-
where in the region, with substantial remittances already in the mid-1990s. While 
the varying estimates are difficult to reconcile, remittances were probably below 
one fifth of GDP. The number of labor migrants is estimated at less than one mil-
lion; even if many of these are in fact long-term emigrants, their number is large 
relative to an economically active population in Georgia of approximately 
2 million. Labor migration and remittance inflows have a strong macroeconomic 
growth effect at the aggregated level; however, not all sectors and residents are 
affected symmetrically. The positive effect of remittances is pronounced in manu-
facturing, large-scale agriculture, construction, and service sectors concentrated 
mostly in the urban areas of the country. The impact on the production of house-
hold farmers (or small agriculture) depends on the geographical location and iden-
tity of households. In distant regions with high transaction costs, for example, 
farm production increases substantially, while in regions with lower transaction 
cost farm production decreases once farmers have access to remittance incomes. 
As a result, remittances have a rather limited overall impact on poverty reduction 
and income inequality, especially in rural areas. Their impact on consumption is 
smallest for the group of poor and middle-income rural households and largest for 
urban households with higher incomes. Consequently, the wealthier members of 
the society gain from remittances more than poorer household categories. Better 
access to labor markets, on the contrary, would improve the welfare states of 
many, especially, of the rural poor at the outset. 
These simulation results for Georgia suggest that government and donor poli-
cies should prioritize a pro-poor approach in improving institutions within the 
country, especially by improving access to labor and credit markets. With the fo-
cus on the inclusion of the rural poor in the financial sector, for example, policies 
could be designed for meeting the production needs of farmers in distant regions. 
This would include opportunities to link remittance flows with family-based mi-
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crofinance mechanisms focused on promoting saving, insurance and investment 
within a given region, as well as decreasing transaction costs across regions. 
In Kyrgyzstan (Section 3.5) remittances also play a very important role in the 
economy; by official estimates for 2007, remittances exceeded one quarter of the 
country’s GDP. The number of labor migrants is estimated at 15-20% of total la-
bor force in the country; their main destination countries are Russia and Kazakh-
stan. Kyrgyz labor migrants represent all segments of the society, but majority of 
them originate from labor abundant and land scarce rural areas and small towns in 
the southern part of the country. While wealthier households receive more remit-
tances than poor ones because of better education and access to information, the 
role of remittances is larger for poor households. Private consumption and gov-
ernment revenues (through taxation of remittance-driven imports) depend substan-
tially on remittances. In the absence of migration, all types of households would 
be worse off, with considerable losses for GDP, private and government consump-
tion. 
The situation in Russia (Section 4) mirrors in some way the emigration coun-
tries as Russia is the predominant destination for labor migrants within the CIS. 
Inward labor migration has come to play a significant role in the Russian econ-
omy. The data situation is less than satisfactory as Russian official statistics usu-
ally quote migration flows, while the World Bank estimates the stock of immi-
grants, rendering comparisons difficult. Thus official sources put the number of 
immigrants arriving to Russia in 2006 at less than 200,000 individuals, mostly 
from CIS countries. By contrast, the total immigrant population is estimated by the 
WB at 12 million individuals in 2005. Remittances make up only a small part of 
Russian outward capital flows, with estimates ranging from US$ 6 billion (Central 
Bank of Russia) to US$ 12 billion (World Bank) US$. 
Our CGE-model-based simulations are designed to assess the direct and indi-
rect effects of migration on the sectoral structure of the Russian economy. An 
increase in labor migration increases the supply of labor for all industries, pushes 
wages down, and raises rent (capital income). The fall in the wage rate drives do-
mestic prices down and stimulates exports. The price ratio of tradables to nontrad-
ables increases, along with the real and nominal exchange rates, all implying a real 
depreciation of the Russian currency. Both the direct and the indirect effects work 
in the same direction, with the indirect effects dominating. 
Section 5 concludes that, while these country case studies do not analyze spe-
cific policy measures, they demonstrate large potential benefits from labor migra-
tion and remittances for migrants’ home countries. These potential benefits, as 
well as the attending risks, depend in important ways on government policies re-
lated to migration in both, home and host countries. Against the backdrop of the 
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migration-related policies currently pursued in the CIS region and in the EU, three 
major policy implications emerge. 
First, some CIS country governments faced with large migrant outflows have 
been reluctant, for political reasons, to even acknowledge that emigration is taking 
place on a large scale. Consequently, they have failed to provide support services, 
such as effective consular support, job placement through recognized agencies, or 
advocacy for more legal migration opportunities with host country government. 
By providing such services, sending country governments would help to limit the 
risks faced by migrants and enhance the benefits of migration to migrants and their 
families as well as sending country economies overall. 
Second, for economic recovery to take hold in the smaller, natural-resource-
poor CIS countries, fixed investments need to be sustained and increased further. 
Remittances could help to pay for such investment. However, the business and 
investment climate in many of these countries is so poor that, currently, remit-
tances are only rarely used for productive investment. Government efforts to 
channel remittances into investment, which are debated in many CIS countries, 
will succeed only when all investors can expect to receive an adequate return on 
productive investments that is not diminished by parasitic public institutions. 
Third, destination countries will increasingly find themselves competing not 
only for high-skilled migrants, but also for those willing to perform jobs that are 
otherwise difficult to fill (such as seasonal work in agriculture, construction, and 
social services). Russia, the most important host country for migrants from the CIS 
region, is currently offering legal employment on a fairly broad basis, even though 
the number work permits has recently been cut because of the effects of the finan-
cial crisis. By contrast, legal employment opportunities in the European Union are 
still limited, although legalization programs such as in Italy and Portugal will soon 
create pockets of legal migrants that will become the hubs of future migrant net-
works. As these networks will attract more family-based and other immigration 
from CIS countries in the future, it would be in the interest of both migrants and 
EU host countries to replace haphazard legalizations with a forward-looking strat-
egy for admitting migrants with good job prospects in the EU. Since the EU func-
tions as a single labor market, such programs should be coordinated at the EU 
rather than the national level. For the benefit of both, CIS countries and the EU, 
the deepening of bilateral relations under European Neighborhood Policy should 
include enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration. 
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2. The Macroeconomic Context 
The stylized facts of macroeconomic development in the CIS countries during 
the last two decades are fairly straightforward. After the disintegration of the for-
mer Soviet Union in 1991, GDP fell sharply in all five countries covered by this 
study (Figure 2.1; all data in Figures 2.1 through 2.4 are from the World Bank’s 
Word Development Indicators Database). This precipitous fall was followed by 
prolonged stagnation at a low level during the second half of the 1990s, with some 
further losses as a result of the Russian financial crisis in 1998. A sustained recov-
ery began around 2000 in most countries and still continues as of mid-2008. While 
total output is still below its pre-independence level in most CIS countries, house-
hold final consumption expenditures have recovered much better (Figure 2.2); in 
several countries, they had regained or even surpassed their 1990 levels by 2006. 
By contrast, fixed investment recovered much more slowly (Figure 2.3) and the 
picture for government final consumption is rather mixed across the CIS countries 
covered by this study (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.1. Total GDP, 1990 to 2006 
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Figure 2.2. Household final consumption expenditures, 1990 to 2006 
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Figure 2.3. Gross fixed capital formation, 1990 to 2006 
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The driving forces behind this development are somewhat less clear. Indeed, 
they have been the subject of contentious debates that evolved considerably as 
events unfolded. The post-independence output collapse is probably explained 
largely by the rapid collapse of institutions that regulated trade during the Soviet 
period, while initially the necessary institutional infrastructure for market-based 
economic relations (functioning currencies, hard budget constraints, enforceable 
contracts) did not exist. An additional role was played by the sharp reductions in 
government procurement, which particularly affected the military industrial com-
plex. 
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Figure 2..4. General government final consumption, 1990 to 2006 
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The gradual emergence of market-enabling institutions helps to explain why 
trade among the CIS countries, along with output, stabilized during the mid-1990s. 
However, observers continued to note many persistent shortcomings regarding 
corporate governance, the business climate, and the investment environment. 
Therefore, the sustained recovery since 2000 is more difficult to explain. Indeed, 
investment appears to have lagged, rather than led, the output recovery. One factor 
that has clearly played a role in the recovery is the resurgence of Russian import 
demand for CIS products on the heels of rising world market prices for energy 
materials since the late 1990s. Higher Russian import demand would have led to 
higher exports by the other CIS countries and higher rates of capacity utilization. 
Another factor that contributed to the recovery has been the growing demand for 
non-tradable goods and services (a Dutch-disease-style effect) throughout the re-
gion. It resulted from rising oil and gas revenues in the case of Russia and from 
sharply rising migrant remittances since the late 1990s in the remaining countries 
(Figure 2.5). 
The available time-series data on migrant remittances are based on balance of 
payments statistics (as compiled by the International Monetary Fund in its Balance 
of Payments Statistics Database), representing the sum of credit items from com-
pensation of employees (income account) and workers’ remittances (transfer ac-
count). Data quality varies widely across countries, especially with respect to 
whether they include estimates of cash transfers through informal channels in ad-
dition to transfers through the banking system and money transfer operators. For 
every country, however, there is a substantial increase in migrant remittances from 
Atamanov, Luecke, Mahmoud, Mogilevsky, Tereshchenko, Tourdyeva, Uzagalieva, Vavryshchuk 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 86 16 
about 2000. The picture for Georgia is more nuanced in that there were substantial 
remittances as early as the mid-1990s; notably, Georgia’s GDP also began to re-
cover at that time, earlier than elsewhere in the region. The 2007 data point for 
Ukraine clearly represents a break in the underlying time series; indeed, the low 
level of remittances suggested by the pre-2007 estimates is not plausible, given 
Ukraine’s large migrant population abroad. 
 
Figure 2.5. Migration remittances, 1997 to 2007 (million US$) 
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Figure 2.6. Russia: Migrant remittances credit and debit, 2001 to 2007 (billion US$) 
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Balance of payments data for Russia, which hosts most labor migrants from 
CIS countries, represent the mirror image of these developments. Remittances by 
incoming migrants (“debit” items) rose to almost US$ 17 billion in 2007 from 
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around US$ 1 billion in 2001 (Figure 2.6). Remittances received by Russian expa-
triates also increased, but remained below US$ 3 billion in 2007. 
While balance of payments statistics provide at least a starting point for assess-
ing the evolution of migrant remittances over time and across countries, the data 
situation with respect to the number of labor migrants is even more problematic. 
Official data on population movements are often not helpful because a large pro-
portion of labor migration occurs illegally. Furthermore, labor migration occurs in 
many different settings, ranging from seasonal movements to immigrants becom-
ing citizens of the host country. Standard definitions of migrant status based on 
foreign birth or foreign citizenship may therefore lead to very different estimates. 
Furthermore, these estimates may be difficult to interpret when a country like the 
Soviet Union, where internal migration was extensive, is split up into several 
countries while new national identities and allegiances are only evolving. 
A comprehensive country-by-country matrix of the number of foreign-born 
residents has recently been compiled by the World Bank; the IFAD remittances 
database uses these migrant numbers to estimate migrant remittances in 2006 (Ta-
ble 2.1). Although both data sets are subject to many uncertainties, they represent 
the best combined estimates of labor migration and remittances available across a 
wide range of countries, drawing on a wide variety of national data sources. For 
the countries covered by this study, remittances are estimated at close to one third 
of GDP in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, and at about one fifth in Georgia. Although 
much larger in absolute terms, remittances in Ukraine amount to less than one 
tenth of GDP. In Russia, remittances received from emigrants are small by com-
parison at less than 2% of GDP. 
The large number of emigrants estimated for Russia and Ukraine reflects in 
part large groups of ethnic Russian- and Ukrainian-born residents in other coun-
tries of the Former Soviet Union, rather than recent labor migrants to richer coun-
tries. Many of these individuals have probably resided there since before the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union in 1991; their motivations for staying or leaving in 
their host countries are therefore bound to be rather different from recent labor 
migrants motivated by higher potential incomes abroad. Accordingly, also, the 
remittances received by Russian and Ukrainian as reported in Table 2.1 are likely 
to be overestimated somewhat.  
Overall, this brief review of macroeconomic developments and remittances in 
the CIS countries covered by this study suggests that, other than in Russia, remit-
tances have sustained private consumption and contributed to the resumption of 
GDP growth since 2000. Migration and remittances are large enough not only to 
improve the welfare of remittance-receiving households, but also to affect macro-
economic variables such as the real exchange rate and wage levels and thus alter 
Atamanov, Luecke, Mahmoud, Mogilevsky, Tereshchenko, Tourdyeva, Uzagalieva, Vavryshchuk 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 86 18 
the sectoral structure of the economies, thereby generating further indirect effects 
on the welfare of all households, whether or not they receive remittances. These 
effects will be analyzed further in Sections 3 and 4 below through simulations 
based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for the selected CIS 
countries. 
 
Table 2.1. Selected CIS Countries: Migrants and Remittances, 2006 
Remittances 
 US$ million percent of GDP 
Migrants  
(thousand) 
Georgia 1,525 20.2 1036 
Kyrgyzstan 846 31.4 597 
Moldova 1,027 31.4 663 
Ukraine  8,471 8.0 5878 
Russia: immigrants n.a. n.a. 11977 
Russia: emigrants 13,794 1.4 12099 
Source: IFAD remittances database http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/brochure.pdf;  
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html. 
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3. Country Studies: Net Emigration 
Countries 
The following sub-sections present country studies on the effects of migration 
and remittances in selected CIS countries that experienced net emigration of work-
ers: Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Each country study involves the 
application of a standard single-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to a social accounting matrix that was developed under the ENEPO project. 
The underlying CGE model is the well-documented IFPRI (International Food 
Policy Research Institute) standard model (Lofgren et al. 2002) which has been 
widely applied to developing countries. Its straightforward basic structure with a 
choice of standard neoclassical and neo-structuralist assumptions, its user-friendly 
and well-documented code (in GAMS software), and its easy adaptability to na-
tional circumstances (different levels of aggregation for households, the agricul-
tural sector, etc.) render it well-suited for the present analysis. 
We also explored the feasibility of using a recursive-dynamic version of the 
IFPRI standard CGE model to complement our comparative-static simulations. A 
more explicitly dynamic structure would reflect the investment process more accu-
rately and thereby provide additional insights into the growth effects of remit-
tances. However, the additional assumptions required to implement a recursive-
dynamic model turned out to be far-reaching. Overall, we would have introduced a 
high level of arbitrariness into the analysis such that the more detailed description 
of the investment process in the recursive-dynamic model would ultimately have 
been meaningless. 
In constructing the social accounting matrices, we combine input output tables, 
other national accounts information, household budget surveys, labor force statis-
tics, and fiscal statistics, among other data sources. A key difficulty is that official 
data tend to understate migration and remittances in some countries because a 
large proportion of remittances are transferred as foreign exchange cash and much 
migrant employment is informal. For the databases to reflect realistic orders of 
magnitude, various data sources are drawn upon and appropriate adjustments 
made. The level of aggregation (number of commodities, sectors, factors of pro-
duction, and household types) differs slightly across the country studies. 
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The following section summarizes some key features of the IFRPI standard CGE 
model. Each of the subsequent country studies starts with a discussion of the data 
situation and goes on to report simulation results that seek to answer the question 
of what each economy would look like without migration and remittances. These 
effects are disaggregated by household type and followed through the economy. 
 
 
3.1. Overview over the IFPRI standard CGE model1 
 
In general, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are used to analyze 
the effects of policy changes and other shocks (such as an opening to labor migra-
tion) throughout the economy. CGE models may be viewed as an extension of 
multi-sector input-output and fixed price models and incorporate the indirect ef-
fects and price effects of policies. They apply to the time period it takes for an 
economy to move from one equilibrium to another, in response to a policy change 
or other shock. In this sense, a static CGE model as used in the following country 
studies generates a medium-term solution - a situation where the initial disequilib-
rium after the shock has disappeared, but before dynamic effects (such as addi-
tional investment or disinvestment) set in. 
The database for a CGE model is the social accounting matrix (SAM) for a 
given year, a square matrix that describes all commodity and monetary flows 
among the economic agents in an economy at a suitable level of aggregation (pro-
duction sectors, households, enterprises, government, the “rest of the world”). 
Depending on the chosen level of aggregation, the SAM combines information 
from input-output accounts, national income and product accounts, household 
budget surveys, labor force statistics, and fiscal statistics, among other data 
sources. Although the case studies in this paper are all based on single-country 
CGE models, CGE models are also implemented for several countries simultane-
ously or for the global economy disaggregated by regions and countries, requiring 
multi-country SAMs. 
Naturally, simulation results based on CGE models depend heavily on assump-
tions about functional forms (such as Leontief vs. CES production functions), un-
derlying parameters (such as substitution elasticities in production and demand 
functions), and macroeconomic balancing mechanisms. Traditional neoclassical 
CGE models are based on Walrasian general equilibrium theory: Firms maximize 
profits, and wages and prices adjust to equate supply and demand in factor and 
                                                 
1 This section draws extensively on Fagernäs (2004). 
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product markets, with factors of production fully employed. By contrast, models in 
the structuralist tradition use different assumptions about macroeconomic balanc-
ing mechanisms and the way markets clear, incorporating features of short-run 
macroeconomic models with wage or price rigidities and unemployment. Many 
CGE models (including in this paper) are real side models without asset markets 
and with neutral money2. 
The IFPRI standard CGE model on which our case studies are based allows for 
a range of alternative assumptions that reflect both the structuralist and the neo-
classical tradition. It is a real-side model without explicitly modeled asset markets 
or inflation3. Production is carried out under perfect competition by sectors (“ac-
tivities”) that maximize their profits, subject to a multi-level production function 
and given the prices of their inputs, outputs and factors. Within each activity, the 
top level of the production function consists of a Leontief function that combines 
an aggregate of the factors of production (value-added) on the one hand and inter-
mediate inputs on the other hand. Factors of production (high-skilled workers, 
low-skilled workers, capital, etc.) are combined according to a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function, while the various intermediate inputs are used in 
fixed proportions (Leontief function). 
Domestic output of a given good (say, food) may be produced by different sec-
tors (say, small farms and commercial agriculture). Aggregate domestic output is 
allocated to exports and domestic sales based on profit maximization with given 
prices, a given quantity of total output and imperfect transformability between 
domestic sales and exports in line with a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function. Export supply is therefore determined by the domestic price of 
exports relative to domestic sales, where the domestic price of exports is the given 
world price of exports adjusted by export taxes and the exchange rate. Thus the 
model assumes a small, open (i.e. price-taking) economy. 
Domestic demand for a given good is the sum of demand for private (house-
hold) consumption, government consumption, investment, and intermediate in-
puts. If a commodity is imported, domestic demand is for a composite commodity 
of imports and domestically produced goods, with the optimal mix determined 
through cost minimisation via a CES aggregation function. This so-called Arming-
ton assumption allows for some decoupling of domestic from world market prices 
and ensures that simulated export and import responses to policy changes will be 
broadly realistic. The supply of imports is infinitely elastic at given world prices. 
                                                 
2 For an overview over the main CGE modeling approaches with references to appropriate 
literature, see Robinson (2003). 
3 For a detailed description of the IFPRI standard model see Lofgren et al. (2002). 
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The domestic price of imports is the given world price adjusted by the exchange 
rate and tariffs. 
Households receive income from factors of production supplied to production 
activities (e.g. labor) and transfers from institutions, particularly the government 
and other households. Households save, consume, and pay direct taxes and trans-
fers; direct tax rates and the propensity to save are determined by the chosen clo-
sure rules for the government and savings-investment balances (see below). 
Household consumption is allocated across different products according to a linear 
expenditure system (LES), which implies in this case that the consumption of in-
dividual commodities is a linear function of total household consumption expendi-
ture. Household types may differ in their demand elasticities and consumption 
shares for each commodity. 
The macro closure rules for the CGE model define the mechanisms by which 
the three macroeconomic balances are determined: (i) the current government 
balance; (ii) the current account balance, and (iii) the savings and investment bal-
ance. First, the government receives its income from taxes and transfers from the 
rest of the world and decides on the level of current spending (government con-
sumption plus transfers to households) vs. government saving. The IFPRI standard 
model allows us to choose between two basic closure rules for the government 
balance. Either direct tax rates are fixed, but government saving (the real fiscal 
balance) adjusts in response to changes in government revenue; or direct tax rates 
adjust to maintain a given level of government saving. 
Second, the savings-investment balance states that total investment is the sum 
of private investment, government investment, and foreign savings. In this static 
model (comparative-static with simulation exercises), investment is not driven by 
the rate of return on capital but by the availability of savings. The standard IFPRI 
model allows for two basic approaches: (i) private savings are investment-driven 
such that the marginal propensity to save adjusts to a given level of investment; 
(ii) investment adjusts to the level of savings, given a fixed marginal propensity to 
save. 
Third, foreign savings are equivalent to the current account deficit and hence 
define the external balance (i.e. the balance of inflows and outflows of foreign 
exchange). Transfers between the rest of the world and domestic institutions and 
factors (including migrant remittances) are exogenous to the model and given in 
foreign currency. Thus the current account balance is driven by the balance of 
exports and imports. The alternative closure rules in the standard IFPRI model 
leave either the real exchange rate or the current account balance constant, requir-
ing the other variable to adjust. 
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Factor market closures determine the mechanisms that equilibrate the supply 
and demand of each factor of production. In line with general equilibrium theory, 
each activity uses a set of factors up to the point where the marginal revenue prod-
uct of each factor equals its wage. There are two wage variables: the economy-
wide wage, and an activity-specific wage that is the product of the economy-wide 
wage and an activity specific wage or distortion term. There are basically three 
possible closure rules: (i) a factor is fully employed and mobile, giving rise to a 
uniform economy-wide wage; (ii) a factor is fully employed and immobile, giving 
rise to sector-specific wage rates; or (iii) a factor is mobile but may be unem-
ployed, allowing the wage to be set as a policy parameter. 
 
 
3.2. Moldova4 
 
Migration and remittances play a key role in the Moldovan economy, with ap-
proximately one quarter of the working-age population working abroad for at least 
part of the year, and remittances equivalent to one third of GDP in 2006. These 
estimates count only those migrants who are still part of a household in Moldova 
(i.e. contribute to household income and share in expenditures); remittances may 
include transfers from individuals who have left Moldova permanently. 
Labor migration from Moldova is remarkable in that poorer households are 
more likely to send a migrant abroad than richer ones, contrary to the situation in 
many other countries where barriers to emigration are more difficult to overcome 
for poor, credit-constrained households. In the case of Moldova, the poor and low-
skilled have the option of taking up employment in Russia, where travel is visa-
free and cheap, although working conditions and wages are often poor. By con-
trast, the EU (especially Italy and Portugal) would be preferred as a host country 
by many migrants because of better pay and conditions, but high up-front costs for 
illegal travel make this a difficult proposition for many poor households. 
Our social accounting matrix is based on the year 2004; available data include 
the national accounts through 2004, including an input-output table, annual house-
hold budget surveys through 2004, quarterly labor force surveys through 2005, 
and a special household survey on migration and remittances conducted in 2004 
and 2006. As is the case in many developing countries, coverage of household 
income by the household budget survey is far from complete, particularly for re-
mittances. Therefore, the national accounts data, which are internally consistent, 
                                                 
4 Authors of this section: Matthias Luecke and Toman Omar Mahmoud. 
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have been used as the starting point in compiling the social accounting matrix. 
Subsequently, the household sector and labor income have been disaggregated 
using percentage shares for different household and labor types derived from the 
household budget survey. The agricultural sector is subdivided into small-scale 
(household) agriculture and agricultural enterprises. 
Our simulations seek to describe what the Moldovan economy would have 
looked like in 2004 without labor migration and remittances. The first simulation 
hypothetically eliminates the recent strong growth in total factor productivity 
(TFP). That TFP growth is apparent from the fact that GDP grew by about one 
third from 2000 through 2004, while fixed investment remained modest and the 
labor force declined. In part, TFP growth may have been a natural result of the 
recovery from the transition-induced crisis, for example due to the emergence of 
market-supporting institutions as systemic transformation takes hold. To this ex-
tent, TFP growth might have occurred even in the absence of migration. However, 
we consider it plausible that most of the apparent TFP growth results from higher 
utilization rates for existing production capacity that arose as a consequence of 
remittances-induced demand growth. 
The second and third simulations separately describe the impact of a sharp re-
duction in remittances and a larger domestic labor supply (if there is no labor mi-
gration). The fourth simulation combines lower remittances and a larger labor 
supply, and the fifth simulation adds lower TFP. It turns out (Table 3.1) that the 
combined effects under the fourth scenario are very similar to the sum of the sepa-
rate effects under the second and third scenario; similarly, the combined effects for 
all simulated shocks under the fifth scenario are very similar to the sum of the 
separate effects under the first, second, and third scenario. Therefore, in discussing 
the results, we focus on the fifth scenario. 
 
Table 3.1. Moldova: Simulation Results (base values and percentage changes in real 
terms) 
 Base run 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Macro variables 
Domestic absoprtion 412 -13.8 -13.2 9.0 -4.1 -21.6 
Private consumption 276 -20.6 -19.7 13.4 -6.1 -32.1 
Fixed investment 67 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government consump-
tion 52 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exports 155 -26.1 38.0 18.4 58.0 22.4 
Imports -246 -16.4 2.0 11.6 14.6 -7.8 
GDP at market prices 320 -17.8 -0.2 11.6 11.6 -10.9 
Real exchange rate 95 -4.1 4.8 -0.4 2.6 2.7 
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 Base run 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
GDP at factor cost  
A_AGR_L 19 -42.0 -20.7 5.3 -14.7 -42.0 
A_AGR_S 38 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 -4.0 
A_FOOD 22 -24.2 -7.6 11.2 1.3 -21.8 
A_LIGHT 6 -46.5 226.4 51.6 299.0 199.9 
A_WOOD 4 -18.9 -2.1 7.9 4.6 -13.5 
A_CHEM 7 -19.4 -2.2 9.7 6.7 -14.0 
A_MASH 4 -19.7 0.1 7.9 5.8 -10.1 
A_ELEC 7 -19.8 -6.9 11.8 4.4 -17.6 
A_CONSTR 11 -4.0 -0.9 2.4 1.5 -3.3 
A_TRADE 32 -19.3 2.2 12.1 14.2 -9.3 
A_REST 3 -22.2 -6.4 12.5 5.1 -19.1 
A_TRANS 19 -20.9 -2.3 11.4 8.5 -14.8 
A_COMM 17 -21.8 -9.4 10.6 1.6 -22.9 
A_FIN 33 -19.0 -6.7 10.8 4.3 -17.9 
A_PUBLIC 14 -5.3 -4.4 3.4 -1.0 -7.5 
A_PUB_SERV 35 -12.2 -9.6 7.9 -1.7 -16.6 
TOTAL 271 -17.3 -0.1 11.7 11.9 -10.5 
Household consumption (equivalent variation) 
HH_SMALL_FARM 75 -16.7 -41.7 11.6 -31.9 -49.9 
HH_OTH_RUR 69 -24.1 -9.4 15.9 7.7 -25.0 
HH_OTH_URB 51 -23.9 -10.7 13.8 4.1 -26.2 
HH_RICH_URB 28 -22.1 -9.9 14.9 6.2 -23.7 
HH_PUBLIC_SECTOR 17 -23.8 -17.7 14.9 -2.2 -32.3 
HH_TRANSFER 35 -14.7 -14.9 10.0 -4.6 -23.3 
Note. Scenario 1 – TFP reduced by 20 pc (except in small-scale agriculture). Scenario 2 – 
Remittances reduced by 70 pc. Scenario 3 – Labor supply increased by 20 pc (except high-
skilled and non-agriculture self-employed: 10 pc). Scenario 4 – Remittances reduced and 
labor supply increased. Scenario 5 – TFP and remittances reduced, labor supply increased. 
 
Our simulation results suggest that household consumption would be reduced 
sharply in the absence of migration and remittances. This applies both to total 
consumption, which would fall by 32.1 percent, and to every household group. In 
relative terms, the losses would be largest for small farmers (with consumption cut 
in half) because (i) migration, including for seasonal work, is very widespread in 
the countryside, and (ii) higher disposable incomes in the population at large are 
strengthening demand for local food products. 
GDP would fall by approximately one tenth under the fifth scenario and thus 
by much less than private consumption. A comparison of the GDP effects under 
the first, third, and fifth scenario demonstrates that GDP would decline mainly 
because we assume that without migration, total factor productivity (TFP) would 
not improve as much as it actually did. As discussed above, total factor productiv-
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ity should be thought of in this context as predominantly reflecting higher rates of 
capacity utilization, rather than technological change. The positive output effect of 
migrant workers returning home and adding to the local labor force (under the 
third scenario) would be insufficient to compensate for the fall in TFP. 
Without migration and remittances and the associated TFP growth, the Moldo-
van currency would depreciate in real terms, adjusting to lower foreign exchange 
inflows as remittances are reduced. Our closure rules for these simulations imply 
that foreign savings, investment, and government consumption are exogenous. 
While foreign savings are adjusted to reflect lower migrant remittances under the 
second, fourth and fifth scenario, investment and government consumption remain 
constant in real terms relative to the base run. 
The only sector whose output would grow significantly in the absence of mi-
gration and remittances is light industry, whose exports would also increase 
sharply. This simulation result is in line with a conventional Dutch disease effect 
as a result of the inflow of foreign currency through remittances. It is interesting to 
compare these simulation results with recent sectoral changes in the Moldovan 
Economy. Textile and clothing exports from Moldova to the European Union have 
in fact expanded substantially since 2007 even though migration and remittances 
have grown and the Moldovan currency has appreciated further since 2004. These 
recent developments suggest that barriers to trade, rather than high and rising pro-
duction costs because of a Dutch-disease-style real appreciation, impeded the ex-
pansion of the Moldovan textile and clothing sector in the past. With Romania’s 
accession to the European Union, Moldova became a direct EU neighbor, sepa-
rated by only one border from the European single market; it appears that the re-
sulting reduction in informal trade barriers was sufficient to set off the recent wave 
of foreign direct investment and output and export growth in the textile and cloth-
ing industry. 
 
 
3.3. Ukraine 5 
 
3.3.1. Migration data 
 
According to several alternative studies, the overall stock of Ukrainian labor 
migrants working abroad during the late 1990s and early 2000s ranged from 0.8 to 
                                                 
5 Author of this section: Vitaliy Vavryshchuk 
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2 million persons. The latest ILO survey reveals about 780,000 Ukrainian labor 
migrants in other countries (about 3.5 - 4% of total labor force) (IOM 2006). 
These numbers contrast sharply with much lower official data on employment 
permits for Ukrainians working abroad (only 61,400 permits were granted by resi-
dent employment intermediaries in 2006). Of these, more than two thirds are typi-
cally for EU countries, especially Cyprus, Greece, and the UK. 
The latest full-fledged research of labor migration trends in Ukraine was com-
pleted in 2001 when the State Statistics Committee conducted a survey of 18,000 
households in 8 regions (oblasts). The number of labor emigrants in the selected 8 
oblasts was estimated at 380,000 persons. Extrapolation to the whole country 
gives about 800,000 labor migrants. According to the survey about 60% of all 
migrants were employed in countries which are currently the members of the 
enlarged EU. The most attractive destinations for Ukrainians at that time were 
Poland (hosting about 18% of Ukrainian labor migrants), Czech Republic (17%), 
Italy (8.5%), and Portugal (3.8%) (Poznyak 2002). 
Another survey of Ukrainian households in eight Western regions of Ukraine in 
2005 indicates that ranking of most popular destinations among Ukrainian mi-
grants changed somewhat. Italy topped the list of most desired destinations with 
60% of votes, followed by Portugal (31%), Spain (24%), and Poland (23%). Out 
of ten most frequently mentioned countries, seven were the EU member states 
(Starodub & Parkhomenko 2005). 
The true scale of Ukrainian labor migrants’ presence in some European coun-
tries was revealed during regularization programs. In 2002 the Italian government 
ran a two-month regularization program for housemaids and contract workers. Out 
of 341,000 of applications from housemaids, 27% were submitted by Ukrainians. 
During the regularization program in Portugal running from January 2001 till 
March 2003, more than 62,000 temporary work permits (out of a total of 180,000) 
were granted to Ukrainians (Poznyak 2006). 
The share of Ukrainian labor emigrants coming from small cities is estimated at 
42% while villagers account for about 29% and people from big cities make 25% 
of total number of labor migrants. Migrants from the capital accounted for just 
3.0% of overall migrants stock abroad while Kyiv population exceeds 6.5% of the 
country population. In terms of professional structure most of Ukrainian men 
working abroad are construction or agricultural workers. At the same time, most of 
women choose to be employed as housemaids. 
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3.3.2. Remittances data 
 
Statistics on migrants’ remittances in Ukraine are fragmentary and data from 
different sources difficult to reconcile. According to WB study, migrants’ remit-
tances to Ukraine and Moldova (the countries are treated as one sub-region in the 
study) totaled some USD 0.44bn (Mansoor & Quillin 2006)6. Although the abso-
lute numbers on remittances seem to be strongly underestimated under the WB’s 
approach, the geographical distribution of remittance inflow is worth attention. 
About 50% of remittances to the region come from EU-15 countries, while 37% 
originated from Russia and other CIS resource-rich countries. Another 5% are 
attributed to remittances from new EU member states. 
 
Figure 3.1. Migrants’ remittance to Ukraine in 2003-07 by BoP categories 
(USD billion) 
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Source: NBU. 
 
Another recent study by the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) puts Ukraine among the top world nations receiving the largest amount of 
migrants’ remittances in absolute terms. The IFAD estimated total remittances 
transferred to Ukraine in 2006 at USD 8.5bn, or 8.0% of the country’s GDP that 
year. To compare, inward remittances are estimated at 1.4% of GDP for Russia, 
3.9% for Romania, and 1.4% for Poland (IFAD 2006). 
Ukrainian official statistics on total workers’ remittances and labor income 
abroad are far from complete and reliable. According to the balance of payments, 
                                                 
6 Statistics on migrants’ remittances are estimated by summing up workers’ remittances 
and compensation of employees categories from the Balance of Payments statistics. 
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Ukrainian workers received USD 171 million of factor income abroad and trans-
ferred USD 193 million as remittances in 2004. This is unrealistically low, given 
large-scale labor out-migration from the country. In order to upgrade statistics we 
classify transfers to “other sectors” as workers’ remittances in line with the OECD 
recommendations. This gives us more realistic overall USD 2.4bn of transfers into 
Ukraine, or 7% of total household consumption. 
Remittances are crucial for many Ukrainian households and regions. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that remittances-induced domestic demand was the key factor 
behind dynamic development of local manufacturing in Western Ukraine. Mi-
grants’ remittances are spent in a number of ways: purchases of real estate, repair-
ing of dwelling, purchases of cars, material aid for relatives, and payment for high 
education. Obviously remittances have many indirect effects which are in most 
cases difficult to quantify. First, remittances spent to pay for higher education 
enhance formation of the country’s human capital contributing to higher potential 
GDP. Second, some returning migrants invest money in new business start-ups 
increasing economic potential of regional economies in the long-run. Remittances 
are also an important source of foreign exchange to Ukraine, which is especially 
important in view of growing deficit of merchandise trade and income balances 
observed in the country since 2005. Thus, inflow of remittances helps to partially 
compensate for otherwise increasingly negative balance of current account. 
 
3.3.3. Database for CGE model 
 
The household budget survey that we used to disaggregate income among types 
of households does not distinguish remittances as a separate type of income 
source. Presumably, respondents counted remittances as a part of “other income”. 
However, the distribution of “other incomes” across types of households does not 
correspond to the likely pattern of remittances in Ukraine. For example, “rich” 
(top 2 deciles in terms of per capita income) urban households have more than 
twice as much “other income” as “normal” urban households although it is 
unlikely that “normal” households benefit from migrant’s remittances to a lesser 
extent than “rich” households. Therefore, we have adjusted the data so as to reflect 
a plausible distribution of remittances across different types of households. 
Our social accounting matrix for Ukraine (input data for standard IFRPI model) 
is based on input-output tables at basic and consumer prices, National Accounts of 
Ukraine, the balance of payments, the Statistical Appendix to the November 2005 
IMF country report on Ukraine, and Household Budget Survey raw data for the 
forth quarter of 2004. The quarterly household survey covers a sample of about 
10,060 households and 25,700 household members. We distinguish 16 sectors 
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(including small-scale and large-scale agricultural production) and 6 factors of 
production (including low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor). In disaggregating 
the household sector, we deviate from our practice for the more agricultural coun-
tries (such as Moldova) by not including agricultural smallholders separately be-
cause they account for less than 1 percent of all households in Ukraine. 
 
3.3.4. Simulation results 
 
Simulations results for the Ukrainian CGE model are qualitatively similar to 
those for Moldova. However, we use a different set of parameter changes to esti-
mate basic macroeconomic indicators for the hypothetical “remittances-and-
migration free” Ukrainian economy, given that migration and remittances in 
Ukraine are less predominant than in Moldova. TFP is reduced by 10% (scenario 
1), remittances are reduced by 70% (scenario 2), and labor supply increased by 5% 
(scenario 3) – see Table 3.2. 
Results of simulations reveal that the “pure” effect of remittances was quite 
modest. However, indirect effects of migration appear to be much more substan-
tial. First, the assumption that TFP would be lower without migration and remit-
tances implies a substantial indirect welfare gain through migration and remit-
tances. Second, in the case of “no migration”, the economy would have had a lar-
ger labor force and higher GDP. The net effect of remittances (accounting for both 
direct and indirect effects) proves to be impressive. The 2004 hypothetical econ-
omy would have lost about 7.1% of its potential without migration and remittances 
induced effects. 
Light and food industry are the key beneficiaries of demand effects due to re-
mittances. These sectors would have contracted by about 17% and 14% if the 
economy did not benefit from workers’ transfers. On the other hand, machinery, 
construction and public administration services seem to be quite remittance-neutral 
sectors. 
All types of households benefit substantially from remittances: their overall 
consumption would have been lower by 14 to 21% in the hypothetical “remittance 
and migration free” Ukrainian economy of 2004. Rich urban households appear to 
win the most, while households with most of income coming as government trans-
fers gain the least from remittances and remittance-induced effects. Noteworthy, in 
case of increase in supply of all types of labor (by 5%), rich urban households may 
gain an extra 8% (the most) in terms of overall consumption. This reflects the fact 
that households of this type possess the highest share of skilled, well-paid labor. 
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Table 3.2. Moldova: Simulation Results (base values and percentage changes in real 
terms) 
 Base run 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Macro variables 
Domestic absoprtion 320 -10.2 -2.9 3.9 1.0 -10.5 
Private consumption 186 -17.5 -5.0 6.7 1.7 -18.0 
Fixed investment 77 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government consump-
tion 61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exports 211 -9.5 2.9 3.6 6.5 -4.0 
Imports -185 -10.9 -1.5 4.1 2.6 -9.2 
GDP at market prices 345 -9.5 -0.2 3.6 3.5 -7.1 
Real exchange rate 94.6 0.6 1.8 -0.3 1.4 2.3 
GDP at factor cost  
A_AGR_L 26.6 -18.6 0.5 3.7 4.2 -9.7 
A_AGR_S 24.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 -5.5 
A_FOOD 12.3 -14.7 -3.5 5.6 2.1 -14.4 
A_LIGHT 2.7 -21.3 -1.4 6.1 4.8 -16.9 
A_WOOD 5.1 -10.8 -0.7 4.2 3.5 -8.3 
A_CHEM 28.1 -9.3 3.0 3.7 6.7 -3.7 
A_MASH 13.4 -6.3 3.0 2.2 5.1 -0.6 
A_ELEC 12.6 -11.1 -0.5 4.3 3.8 -8.5 
A_CONSTR 14.1 -0.7 -0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.6 
A_TRADE 38.6 -11.2 -0.1 4.2 4.1 -8.3 
A_REST 2.2 13.1 -0.9 4.9 3.9 -10.2 
A_TRANS 29.8 -11.1 -0.5 3.8 4.3 -7.5 
A_COMM 11.3 -13.9 -2.7 5.0 2.4 -12.8 
A_FIN 42.8 -9.8 -0.3 3.6 3.3 -7.4 
A_PUBLIC 14.8 -2.9 -0.2 1.2 0.9 -2.3 
A_PUB_SERV 31.3 -5.3 -1.3 2.1 0.8 -5.2 
TOTAL 310 -9.2 0.0 3.5 3.5 -6.8 
Household consumption (equivalent variation) 
HH_O_RUR 40 -19.7 -5.8 7.4 1.6 -20.3 
HH_O_URB 40 -18.3 -4.8 6.7 1.9 -18.4 
HH_R_URB 20 -21.9 -5.3 8.4 3.1 -21.3 
HH_PUB 20 -17.7 -6.7 6.6 -0.2 -19.7 
HH_TRANS 60 -13.5 -3.9 5.6 1.8 -13.8 
Note. Scenario 1 – TFP reduced by 10 pc (except in small-scale agriculture). Scenario 2 – 
Remittances reduced by 70 pc. Scenario 3 – Labor supply increased by 5 pc. Scenario 4 – 
Remittances reduced and labor supply increased. Scenario 5 – TFP and remittances re-
duced, labor supply increased. 
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3.4. Georgia 7 
 
Georgia is a small country that has seen a significant outflow of migrants and, 
at the same time, a large inflow of foreign currency in the recent years. While the 
available data only provide an incomplete picture, accumulated net migration since 
the beginning of the 1990s exceeded 880,000 individuals (with some return mi-
grants in 2004 and 2005; Statistical Yearbook of Georgia 2007). Inward remit-
tances to Georgia amounted to more than US$ 800 million in 2006, equivalent to 
about 10.2% of GDP and 72% of the incoming foreign direct investments (US$ 
1,100 million)8. The size of unofficial remittances is also large, about US$ 315 
million or 39.4% of the total amount of remittances9. Meanwhile, according to the 
official sources, about more than a third of population (35%) is below the national 
poverty line: Georgia is ranked 97th in the list of countries by human development 
index in 2006. 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the poverty effect of remittance 
flows in Georgia through direct and indirect channels within the context of the 
social accounting matrix based CGE model. The main questions of interest are 
whether and to what extent a large size of the remittance flows contributes to the 
production and consumption pattern of the poor. Two aspects of poverty reduction 
are emphasized in this study: (1) the impact of remittances on the aggregated and 
sectoral production growth; and (2) the impact of remittances on poor households, 
their production and consumption patterns across regions. In addition, this study 
pays particular attention to regional differences in terms of market access and 
transaction costs, apart from households’ factor endowments and consumption 
patterns reported elsewhere. 
The available Georgian data cover the national accounts, including the input-
output table, detailed balance of payments, annual report on household surveys10, 
and raw data on household budget surveys for 2004. These surveys were con-
ducted in 3551 households inhabiting the capital city (Tbilisi) and 9 regions 
through the questionnaires “Shinda 04” for household expenditures, “Shinda 05” 
for private and state transfers to households, and “Shinda 05-1” for households 
                                                 
7 Author of this section: Ainura Uzagalieva. The author thanks Kseniya Tereshchenko for 
extracting the raw data on household budget surveys from the Access databases and Levan 
Gogoberishvili for providing the Georgian dataset. 
8 Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (GEPLAC): Georgian Economic 
Trends, Quarterly Economic Trends, February, 2008. 
9 Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (GEPLAC): Georgian Economic 
Trends, Quarterly Economic Trends, October, 2007. 
10 SDSG: “Households of Georgia”,  2003-2004 
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income from employment and self-employment which are used in this study11. The 
source of the data is the State Department for Statistics of Georgia (SDSG). 
 
3.4.1. General macroeconomic and institutional environment in Georgia 
 
Georgia is a mountainous country with population of 4.5 million and area of 
69.7 thousands sq. km. The topographical features of the country’s territory are 
very contrasting including the Great Caucasian chain (5,068 meters above the sea 
level), the medium height mountains (about 3000 meters) and inner lowlands (e.g. 
Kolkheti and Alazani) which are used predominantly for cultivating tea, citrus, 
grapes and other agricultural products (the arable area is about 11% of the terri-
tory). There is a total of 12 regions in the country, including a capital region (Tbi-
lisi), two autonomous republics and 9 ordinary regions, which are geographically 
and economically very diverse. The macroeconomic structure of the economy, in 
terms of the average shares of value added and total output by regions (Table 3.3), 
shows that industry and service activities are concentrated mostly in the capital 
city Tbilisi and a few other regions located predominantly at inner lowlands (e.g. 
Region 4). Agriculture is more widespread across the regions and plays a crucially 
important role as a source of production and employment. It accounts for about 
21% of the gross value added and represents itself the largest employer of domes-
tic labor (54%). 
The macroeconomic situation in Georgia is characterized generally by high 
volatility caused by both external and internal factors. A slowdown in the annual 
growth rate, from 11.7% in 2003 to 7.5% in 2006, stemmed from the trade em-
bargo imposed by Russia on Georgia in 2005 and 2006 as well as political instabil-
ity and inflation pressures existing within the country. According to the annual 
reports of the Georgian central bank, the large sizes of current account (1.2 bn. 
USD) and trade (2.0 bn. USD) deficits in 2006 originated from the fall of exports, 
followed the Russian trade embargo. High prices for the imported mineral prod-
ucts have also amplified inflation; it rose to 9% in 2006 from the average rate of 
5% during the period from 2000 to 2002. Additional inflation factors became the 
large inward remittances and capital flows in foreign currency. With underdevel-
oped capital markets, the central bank could not sustain effectively large sterilized 
interventions. 
 
                                                 
11Shinda stands for the Georgian abbreviation of households observation (see State De-
partment for Statistics of Georgia: “Households of Georgia, 2003-2004”). 
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Table 3.3. The regions and main activities of Georgia 
 
Re-
gions Industry 
Hotels 
and res-
taurants 
Transport 
and 
communi-
cations 
Construc-
tion 
Agricul-
ture 
Georgia, total 
including: 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Kakheti Reg. 1 3.62 0.52 0.11 1.77 14.32 
City of Tbilisi Reg. 2 43.47 77.83 78.99 63.00 0.10 
Shida Kartli Reg. 3 7.51 1.67 0.07 4.61 7.33 
Kvemo Kartli Reg. 4 21.36 1.64 1.87 4.44 18.67 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti Reg. 5 3.71 5.32 0.10 2.38 4.71 
Samtskhe-Javaketi Reg. 6 3.98 0.62 0.04 0.81 7.66 
Adjaria Reg. 7 2.64 5.76 8.04 3.74 5.27 
Guria and Racha-
Lechkhumi Reg. 8 1.28 0.79 0.08 1.36 6.88 
Samegrelo-Zemo 
Svaneti Reg. 9 1.83 2.10 10.32 14.51 16.62 
Imereti Reg.10 10.59 3.76 0.37 3.39 18.45 
Source: SDSG. 
 
The local market conditions and institutions in Georgia are characterized gen-
erally by fragmented labor and credit markets, while the number of people living 
below the poverty line is large. In order to demonstrate the poverty situation in 
Georgia, households are grouped into three categories based on the sample of 6754 
respondents available in the household surveys. These categories include: 1) the 
group of poor households with monthly incomes less than 75 GEL12; 2) the group 
of middle-income households with incomes varying from 76 GEL to 200 GEL; 
and households whose incomes are higher than 200 GEL are assumed in this study 
as high-income or rich ones. According to the country-wide household data, about 
43% of respondents lived below the poverty line in 2004. Rural areas have a 
higher poverty incidence (52%) than the urban ones (35%). 
The poverty profile of household groups by major economic activities (Figure 
3.4.2) is analyzed in terms of a head count ratio calculated within each group. 
Workers engaged in self-employment, family based business enterprises and farms 
have the highest poverty incidence (about 70%). One has to remark that the share 
of self-employed workers is very large, equivalent to about 50% of economically 
active population. Among the groups considered, private employers have the low-
est poverty incidence of less than 10%. 
                                                 
12 This threshold is chosen because it corresponds to the minimum subsistence level (75 
GEL) in Georgia (see SDSG: Statistical Yearbook of Georgia for 2006). 
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A comparison of the regions in terms of individual income reveals a large dif-
ference in intra-regional poverty (Table 3.4and Figure 3.2). The median level of 
household incomes is lower than the mean level and this is true for all regions, 
confirming again a very high overall poverty incidence. Moreover, both median 
and mean levels vary largely from one region to another, that is from 53 GEL and 
74 GEL in Region 7 (Adjaria) to 132 GEL and GEL 177 in Region 2 (Tbilisi). 
From the standard deviation values and the shapes of income distributions traced 
on the basis of individual incomes for every region, one can observe that differ-
ences in terms of poverty gap are also very large between the regions. 
 
Figure 3.2. The distribution of households by income level 
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
 Wage employed   Private employer   Self-employed
outside agriculture  
 Self-employed in
agriculture  
 Working in family
enterprises/farms 
Total
High: above 200 GEL Middle: 75 GEL-200 GEL Low: below 75 GEL
 
Note. Axis – households share by income level (%). 
 
Table 3.4. Distribution of labor incomes by regions 
 Reg. 1 
Reg. 
2 
Reg. 
3 
Reg. 
4 
Reg. 
5 
Reg. 
6 
Reg. 
7 
Reg. 
8 
Reg. 
9 
Reg. 
10 
Maximum 1054 2000 500 950 767 3000 600 1000 850 667 
Minimum 3 3 5 10 5 7 3 10 3 3 
Mean 101 177 92 134 103 143 74 93 123 117 
Median 68 132 70 109 70 100 53 70 87 80 
Standard 
deviation 108 172 78 105 109 210 66 92 113 103 
Source: the author’s calculations. 
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Due to a high incidence of poverty as well as fragmented credit and labor mar-
kets, commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans to clients with low-income 
whose land and other assets are considered inadequate as collateral. In addition, 
the capital markets and pension fund systems are underdeveloped, while the insur-
ance market is very small (0.3% of GDP). As a result, the poor members of the 
society especially in distant regions have limited or no access to credit markets or 
employment opportunities. According to Figure 4, households borrow funds more 
from physical persons (or other households) rather than from financial institutions 
and banks. One should remark also that the size of the borrowed funds varies 
largely from one region to another, implying a very limited access to these funds 
in some regions (e.g. Region 4, 5, 7 and 10). 
Taking into account some of the above-mentioned features of the Georgian 
household sector as well as its macroeconomic and institutional environment, the 
direct and indirect channels between remittance flows and households well-being 
are analyzed. The standard IFPRI CGE model is modified by incorporating the 
regional dimension of market access, apart from differences in households’ factor 
endowments and consumption patterns. The main questions of interest, in this 
respect, are whether and to what extend the poor households groups whose access 
to markets is limited can benefit from larger inward remittance flows and, thus, 
higher disposable incomes at the national levels. 
 
Figure 3.3. Incomes across and within the regions 
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income level by 10 regions
High: above 200 GEL Middle: 75 GEL-200 GEL Low: below 75 GEL
 
Note. Axis – Percentage of households (%). 
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3.4.2. CGE model with regional differences: data calibration and simulation 
results 
 
The Georgian aggregated social accounting matrix is based on the standard IF-
PRI approach, constructed on the economy-wide data. It represents 13 production 
activities from 18 sectors reported in the original input-output tables. The domestic 
production generates 12 commodities. The production of agricultural commodities 
is separated between large and small agricultural enterprises. Transaction costs 
among institutions, including households, enterprises and government originate in 
domestic sales, exports and imports activities. Production factors, which are capi-
tal, labor and self-employment, are decomposed between agriculture and other 
production sectors. Labor is split to high-, medium- and low-skill components 
using the sub-classification of employed by major work positions. 
The original social accounting matrix has been modified in this study by disag-
gregating the small agricultural enterprises into three groups of regions. This was 
done in order to enable the regional dimension of the market access and transac-
tion costs. A basic intuition behind this is that farmers located in the remote or 
mountainous areas of the country face higher transportation and marketing mar-
gins than other regions. In this respect, three types of household farms with the 
highest poverty incidence are distinguished in the model. These are the farm fami-
lies located geographically in regions with high- medium- and low-transaction 
costs. The grouping of regions is based on the topographical features of the coun-
try’s territory. In particular, regions located at the mountainous parts are consid-
ered of having high-transaction costs, regions with small cities and arable land 
face the medium-transaction costs, and the capital city (Tbilisi) with its surround-
ing is the third, i.e. low-transaction cost area. The regional disaggregation of small 
agricultural enterprises into three groups by transaction costs and household 
groups in the social accounting matrix is presented in Table 3.5. Clearly, urban 
households face lower transaction costs with about 88% of their production activi-
ties concentrated in the regions with low and medium transaction costs. As for 
rural households, about 40% of their production activities take place in the regions 
with high transactions costs. 
In examining the poverty profiles, the household accounts are of particular im-
portance because the flows of income and expenditures need to be adequately 
reflected in the social accounting matrix. Therefore, based on the level of incomes 
and geographical location, the households of Georgia are classified into six groups 
including rural-rich, rural-middle income, rural-poor, urban-rich, urban-middle 
income, and urban-poor. 
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Table 3.5. The distribution of small farmers by transaction costs and household 
groups 
Household 
Urban households Rural households 
  
Com-
modi-
ties in 
agricul-
ture 
To-
tal To-tal Rich
Middle 
income Poor
To-
tal Rich
Middle 
income Poor 
Small agri-
culture with: 1121 582 42 26 11 6 539 51 158 331 
- low TC 345 173 1 1 0 0 172 16 51 106 
- moderate 
TC 347 192 36 22 10 5 155 15 45 95 
- high TC 429 217 5 3 1 1 212 20 62 130 
Source: Input-output tables and household surveys (SDSG). 
 
Five illustrative scenarios are set out in Table 3.6 for Georgia. The macroeco-
nomic impact of remittance inflows applied homogeneously across all sectors is 
strongest on the private household consumption and negligible on the GDP growth 
rate. Remittances lead to higher domestic absorption, larger imports and lower 
exports. The combined effect of the hypothetical lack of remittance inflows and 
emigration is negative with respect to all variables considered, with the strongest 
impact on the private consumption, domestic absorption and GDP growth rates 
which would be lower by 24.7%, 13.6% and 13.3%, respectively. 
At the level of individual sectors, a simulated hypothetical stop in remittance 
inflows has a strongest influence on the manufacturing output, which decreases by 
14.9% and large-scale agricultural production by about 8.7%. The impact of remit-
tances on the production by household farmers (or small agriculture) is two-fold. 
In regions with low and high transaction costs, the production increases by 2.8% 
and 1.3%, correspondingly, while in the medium transaction cost regions it falls 
by 2.5%. Presumably, moderate transaction costs allow these farmers to decrease 
the farm related activities substantially and to get involved into other kind of mar-
ket-related activities, once they receive remittances. The positive effect of remit-
tances is pronounced in the construction (4.1%) and service (e.g. hotel and restau-
rants) sectors (2.6%). And the negative impact is on the electricity sector (-2.8%). 
The impact on the remaining sectors is negligible. The combined effect of remit-
tance inflows and emigration is strongest in the small agriculture. Namely, the 
production of farms in regions with low, moderate and high transaction costs falls 
by 13%, 26% and 17%, correspondingly. Only the large agricultural sectors gain 
by about 14.3%. 
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Table 3.6. The results of SAM based CGEM simulations for Georgia 
 Base run 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Macro variables 
Domestic absoprtion 11.3 -2.6 -4.7 7.1 2.4 -15.9 
Private consumption 7.3 -4.0 -7.3 11.0 3.7 -24.7 
Fixed investment 2.8           
Government consumpt. 1.1           
Exports 2.6 -12.7 11.9 8.7 20.5 -1.6 
Imports -4.2 -1.3 -4.3 5.5 1.2 -12.8 
GDP at market prices 9.8 -5.9 -0.3 8.2 7.9 -13.3 
Real exchange rate 97.1 -2.9 3.3 1.2 4.3 3.7 
GDP at factor cost  
Large agriculture and 
other primary sectors 0.6 3.8 -8.7 -6.3 -14.3 -40.5 
Small agriculture       
- low transaction cost 0.2 -9.6 -2.8 17.1 13.5 -12.4 
- medium transaction 
cost 0.4 -10.9 2.5 22.5 25.5 3.1 
- high transaction cost 0.3 -9.0 -1.3 18.7 17.3 -7.5 
Manufacturing 0.7 -12.5 14.9 6.6 21.5 5.4 
Electricity  0.3 -9.8 2.8 11.6 14.3 -12.7 
Processing of products 
by households 0.4 -6.3 -1.9 10.1 8.4 -19.2 
Construction 0.6 -3.3 -4.1 7.6 3.6 -16.5 
Trade and repair of moto 
vehicles 1.0 -5.2 -1.1 8.1 7.0 -13.6 
Hotels and restaurants 0.3 -6.8 -2.6 11.6 9.1 -18.9 
Transportation 0.9 -7.6 0.4 9.5 10.0 -16.4 
Communication services 0.4 -7.0 -1.2 10.7 9.5 -16.6 
Financial, professional, 
other private, services 0.7 -6.4 -0.8 9.4 8.6 -14.7 
Public administr./ NGOs 0.7 -3.7 -0.4 5.2 4.7 -7.9 
Public services and pri-
vate households  0.8 -4.5 -0.4 6.6 6.1 -9.2 
Total 8.4 -6.1 0.0 8.5 8.5 -13.1 
Household consumption (equivalent variation) 
Rural poor HH 0.9 -10.5 -1.0 15.5 14.9 -25.6 
Rural middle-income HH 1.5 -6.8 -0.9 10.9 10.2 -20.3 
Rural rich HH 1.4 -3.4 -7.8 10.5 2.6 -26.0 
Urban poor HH 0.6 -4.0 -7.4 11.0 3.4 -23.9 
Urban middle-income HH 1.2 -5.8 -5.0 11.8 6.8 -22.1 
Urban rich HH 1.8 2.1 -16.9 8.9 -8.6 -29.0 
Note. Scenario 1 – TFP reduced by 20 pc. Scenario 2 – Remittances reduced by 70 pc. 
Scenario 3 – Labor supply increased by 20 pc. Scenario 4 – Remittances reduced and labor 
supply increased. Scenario 5 – TFP and remittances reduced, labor supply increased. 
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In terms of households groups included in the model, the results reveal that 
emigration and remittance flows do not affect all residents symmetrically, but 
depend on the identity of households. In urban areas, remittances contribute to the 
increase of household incomes and consumption smoothing, while in rural areas 
the effect is positive, but rather week. For example, the groups of rural poor and 
middle-income households gain about 1% of their private consumption each, 
while in urban areas these groups gain 7.4% and 5.0%, correspondingly. One can 
observe also that the magnitude of this impact is smaller compared to that on rich 
households with the pure effect of remittances equivalent to 16.9% and 7.8% of 
private consumption, respectively, in urban and in rural areas. Consequently, re-
mittances are beneficial to the wealthier members of this society (i.e. rich house-
holds) in both urban and rural areas. An increase in the supply of labor by 20%, on 
the contrary, would improve the welfare of households in all groups. The rural 
poor would benefit most, with 16% higher private consumption, while this effect 
would be less pronounced for rich urban households, with about 9% higher private 
consumption. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that, while having a strong 
macroeconomic growth effect at the aggregated level, emigration and inward re-
mittance flows do not affect all sectors and residents symmetrically. Moreover, 
they have a rather limited impact on reducing poverty and income inequality. In 
urban areas, for example, remittances contribute to the increase of household in-
comes and consumption smoothing, while in rural areas the effect is two-fold. 
Namely, in regions with low and high transaction costs, remittances are beneficial 
to small farmers, while in the medium transaction cost regions the effect is oppo-
site. Presumably, the moderate level of transaction costs allows these farmers to 
shift from subsistence to market-oriented activities, once they have access to re-
mittances. The magnitude of the impact caused by remittances on the consumption 
pattern is smallest for the group of poor and middle-income rural households 
(1.6% and 1.0%, respectively) and largest for rich urban households. Under the 
absence of remittances, rich households would suffer a loss of about 16.9% in 
their private consumption. Consequently, the wealthier members of the society 
gain more from remittances than poorer household categories. Better access to 
labor markets, on the contrary, would improve the welfare of many, especially, of 
the rural poor at the outset. 
Policy priorities, in these circumstances, should be given to a pro-poor ap-
proach, especially, in improving institutional mechanisms through which the poor 
members of the society can have access to labor and credit markets within the 
country. With the focus on the inclusion of low-income and rural households in 
the financial sector, for example, the policies could be designed for meeting the 
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needs of household farmers in distant regions. This would include also enabling 
various possibilities for linking remittance flows to the microfinance based 
mechanisms focused on promoting savings, insurance and investment within re-
gions, as well as decreasing transaction costs across the regions. 
 
 
3.5. Kyrgyzstan 13 
 
Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic has become very intensive since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Between 1990 and 2005, around 500,000 people left the 
country permanently. Many of these were Russian-speaking Kyrgyz citizens who 
left Kyrgyzstan for permanent residence in Russia and elsewhere. However, dur-
ing the last five years, non-permanent labor migration has increased sharply, espe-
cially in rural areas with high unemployment. The information on the scope of 
labor migration is fragmentary and based mostly on the information from the Kyr-
gyz embassies abroad. According to the conservative estimates of State Committee 
on Migration, about 250,000-300,000 individuals from Kyrgyzstan are currently 
working in Russia and around 100,000 in Kazakhstan. 
The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) is responsible for compil-
ing the balance of payments and consequently for statistics on remittances at the 
macro level. Since NBKR does not have all required information, it has to rely on 
several sensitive assumptions and existing data on money flows to estimate the 
magnitude of remittances. In particular, it has the following information on cross-
border money flows involving participants in the Kyrgyz Republic: 
1. Data on repatriated wages and salaries of foreign employees, who are not 
residents of the Kyrgyz Republic and are working in large joint ventures 
in the Kyrgyz Republic such as Kumtor Operating Company, the largest 
gold-mine enterprise; 
2. Data on international money transfers to and from the Kyrgyz Republic 
done by individuals through banking accounts including card accounts 
(transactions below or equal to $3,000 are considered as workers' remit-
tances), money transfer systems (e.g., the Western Union), as well as the 
postal system; and 
                                                 
13 Authors of this section: Aziz Atamanov and Roman Mogilevsky 
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3. Data on the number of permanent migrants to and from the Kyrgyz Re-
public and the estimated average value of the property that they bring 
with them to the country of destination. 
Important limitation which NBKR faces is the lack of the information on the 
status of workers abroad and the economic nature of the transactions they made 
(e.g., intra-family transfer, payment for goods/services, person-to-person loan 
disbursements, etc.). Hence the current official statistics of remittances represent a 
mix of money flows of different economic nature. 
There were several surveys aimed at estimating the magnitude of remittances 
and the profiles of labor migrants. Till recently on the micro level the household 
budget survey conducted by the National Statistical Committee did not distinguish 
remittances as a separate source of income. The most recent report prepared in the 
framework of the Asian Development Bank’s project on remittances and poverty 
and financial sector development in Kyrgyzstan (Mogilevsky and Atamanov 2008) 
contains the most comprehensive analysis of the impact of remittances on poverty 
and financial sector in Kyrgyzstan. 3995 households were interviewed in the 
framework of this project, providing detailed information on the profile of labor 
migrants and remittances' recipients. 
According to this survey, there were 251.5 thousands labor migrants working 
abroad that account for 5% of the total population and 8.1% of the working-age 
population. The regional distribution of the migrants reflects the regional level of 
economic development: About 70% of all migrants are from rural areas, 10% are 
from Bishkek and 21% are coming from other urban areas. The vast majority of 
the labor migrants choose Russian Federation (82.5%), followed by Kazakhstan 
(12%) and other countries (5.5%). 
Most migrants are employed in the private sector dealing either with construc-
tion (45% of the total number) or trade activities (30.4%). Almost half of the mi-
grants are seasonal workers. However, migrants from Bishkek differ from other 
regions of the country. More of them are employed in sectors requiring higher 
education and higher qualifications (financial intermediation, public administra-
tion, education, health care, etc.). 
According to the survey, the magnitude of remittances coming to the country 
differs significantly from the official NBKR estimates which were growing expo-
nentially during last years ($48.6 million. in 2002 and $730 million in 2006). 
However, the in-depth analysis shows that this rapid growth results mostly from 
increase in large and very large transactions, which cannot necessarily be attrib-
uted to labor migration. 
ADB's estimates on remittances are significantly lower than official numbers 
and range from US$ 223.7 to US$ 287.1 million, with a confidence interval of 
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95%. Most remittances are going to the rural areas. The average amount of cash 
remittances per household in 2006 is US$ 1,331, accounting for 50% of the total 
average household income. 
Remittances come to Kyrgyzstan mainly through banks and MTOs (78.5%), on 
the second place are households themselves (25.6%), on the third place are friends 
and relatives as a source of transfer; the role of postal services is negligible. All 
these show that the role of informal intermediaries is insignificant. 
Simple correlation analysis of the workers' remittances (NBKR data since this 
is the only source of time series on remittances) and various macroeconomic indi-
cators reveals that the growth of remittances contributes to some growth in private 
consumption and GDP, has a positive impact on imports and indirectly on gov-
ernment revenues, can be associated with some employment growth in informal 
sector and does not produce measurable impact on inflation and real exchange 
rate14. 
To have a more detailed picture on the impact of remittances on the Kyrgyz 
economy and the welfare of its citizens, a CGE model was used. The underlying 
social accounting matrix (SAM) for Kyrgyzstan is based on the national accounts 
for 2000-2004, input-output tables for 2003, and the household budget surveys for 
2003-2004. It was also possible to draw on an existing SAM prepared by the 
World Bank for 2003, which has been adjusted to the required format for the stan-
dard IFPRI model and extended by disaggregating the household sector for com-
parable analysis with the other countries in this study. Specifically, the existing 
SAM has 91 sectors and households are divided into deciles for urban and rural 
areas. We aggregated it up to 14 sectors and constructed representative household 
groups comparable with the groups used in Moldova’s SAM, using data from the 
household budget survey. 
Our household categories are (i) agricultural smallholders with more than half 
of their total income from small-plot farming; (ii) other rural households; (iii) rich 
urban households (top 2 deciles by consumption); (iv) other urban households; (v) 
public employee households which draw more than half their income from public 
administration, health and social services; and (vi) pensioners with more than half 
of their total income from state transfers. Labor income is disaggregated into (i) 
income from low-skilled labor: head of household has general secondary or lower 
education; (ii) income from medium-skilled labor: head of household has special 
secondary or incomplete higher education; (iii) income from high-skilled labor: 
                                                 
14 However, the situation has changed dramatically in 2007, when inflation was about 20% 
which is more than cumulative inflation during the last 4 years. Such a sharp increase was 
triggered by external price shocks, but the impact of monetary factors cannot be neglected.  
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head of household has higher education; (iv) income from non-agricultural em-
ployment: household head is self-employed. 
One could identify the following channels of labor migration’s influence on the 
Kyrgyz economy: (i) increase in remittances, (ii) outflow of excess labor from 
agriculture creating conditions of some restructuring in the sector (e.g. some in-
crease in farm size, more commercial orientation of farms run by households 
somewhat insured by remittance flows), probably leading to an increase in total 
factor productivity in this sector; and (iii) brain drain or, in terms of this model, 
outflow of high-skilled labor. Importantly, outflow of lower-skilled labor is con-
sidered to have no effect on labor supply as this labor is effectively unemployed 
on domestic market. 
This considerations allow for formulating four scenarios for simulation of eco-
nomic impact of labor migration: 
1. Increase in remittances by 40%; 
2. Increase in remittances by 40% accompanied by increase in total factor 
productivity in agriculture by 5%; 
3. Increase in remittances by 40% accompanied by reduction in high-
skilled labor supply by 10%; and 
4. Increase in remittances by 40% accompanied by increase in total factor 
productivity in agriculture by 5% and reduction in high-skilled labor 
supply by 10%. 
The simulation results (Table 3.7) suggest that higher remittances (Scenario 1) 
positively influence private consumption and production in sectors oriented 
mainly on domestic market (e.g. agriculture, food processing, trade). Higher remit-
tances also allow financing increased imports. However, the inflow of foreign 
exchange into the country leads to real exchange rate appreciation with negative 
consequences for Kyrgyz exports and production in export-oriented (e.g. mining 
or machine production) and import-competing (e.g. light industry) sectors. Under 
this scenario, the overall effect of remittances on GDP appears to be near neutral. 
Accounting for a TFP increase in agriculture along with higher remittances 
(Scenario 2) results in a more favorable performance of several GDP components, 
with even stronger (6%) growth of private consumption and smaller reduction in 
exports. On the contrary, assessment of combination of remittances and brain drain 
(Scenario 3) leads to much more modest private consumption growth and severe 
deterioration in exports (7.5% decline). Finally, under the last scenario of a simul-
taneous 40% increase of remittances, 5% improvement in farm’s total factor pro-
ductivity and 10% outflow of high-skilled labor, GDP increases by 0.6% due to 
growth in private consumption by 4.6% and despite of 5.9% reduction in exports. 
INCOME AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES…
 
CASE Network Reports No. 86 45 
 
Table 3.7. Kyrgyzstan: Simulation Results (base values in mln Kyrgyz soms and per-
centage changes in real terms) 
 Base run Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Macro variables 
Domestic absoprtion 99402 2.5 4.2 1.5 3.2 
Private consumption 68956 3.6 6.0 2.2 4.6 
Exports 30766 -6.4 -4.8 -7.5 -5.9 
Imports 38627 1.6 2.9 0.8 2.0 
GDP at market prices 91541 -0.1 1.7 -1.2 0.6 
GDP at factor cost 
Agriculture 28094 1.5 4.4 0.5 3.3 
Food processing 1575 2.2 4.7 1.0 3.5 
Light industry 281 -0.7 4.4 -2.0 3.0 
Wood, furniture and 
printing 263 -3.3 -2.3 -5.9 -5.0 
Mining and chemical 
industry 8459 -7.7 -6.8 -7.9 -6.9 
Machine production 1265 -4.9 -4.4 -8.0 -7.5 
Electricity and gas 
distribution 3576 0.0 1.5 -1.1 0.4 
Construction 2301 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.0 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 12286 2.4 4.3 1.3 3.2 
Hotels and restaurants 1217 2.9 4.7 1.6 3.4 
Transportation and 
communication 4210 -1.2 -0.2 -3.1 -2.0 
Financial services 3161 -1.2 -0.3 -5.0 -4.1 
Public administration 3839 0.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Public and other ser-
vices 5692 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.5 
TOTAL 76219 0.0 1.8 -1.1 0.7 
Household consumption (equivalent variation) 
Farming HH 7167 5.7 6.9 3.9 5.0 
Other rural HH 19735 2.6 5.4 0.6 3.3 
Rich urban HHs 12727 3.5 5.6 2.2 4.3 
Other urban HH 11131 4.3 6.9 2.8 5.4 
Public sector employee 
HH 8704 5.5 8.1 6.1 8.7 
Transfer receiving HH 9300 3.6 6.1 1.9 4.4 
Note. Scenario 1 – Remittances increased by 40%. Scenario 2 – Remittances increased by 
40% and TFP in agriculture increased by 5%. Scenario 3 – Remittances increased by 40% 
and high-skilled labor supply reduced by 10%. Scenario 4 – Remittances increased by 
40%, TFP in agriculture increased by 5% and high-skilled labor supply reduced by 10%. 
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All types of households win from increase in remittances. Depending on sce-
nario, some of them win more and others win less. Under the last, “summary” 
scenario public sector employee households, farming households and other (e.g., 
more poor) urban households win more, and transfer-receiving and other rural 
households win relatively less from migration. These results reasonably probably 
reflect the fact that farming and poorer urban households have more migrant 
members, while transfer-receiving (e.g. pensioners) households send fewer mi-
grants to work abroad. 
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4. Country Study: Russia 
4.1. Data availability and quality 
 
The data on immigration into Russia is notoriously unreliable due to the preva-
lence of illegal migration. State agencies report the number of the so-called “regis-
tered immigrants,” i.e. those who comply with the laws that require that both Rus-
sian citizens and foreigners register with the authorities upon arrival to Russia (or 
to a new location). Alternatively, there is official data on the number of work per-
mits issued by the migration authorities and the number of foreigners legally em-
ployed as reported by the companies. Thus, official sources put the number of 
immigrants arriving to Russia in 2006 at slightly over 0.186 million (see Table 
4.1), with the CIS countries accounting for the most of this volume (0.177 mil-
lion). Among them Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine sent over 30 thousands 
migrants each. The leading sources of immigrants from outside of the CIS were 
Germany and Israel. This number holds relatively constant starting with 2001, 
with the exception of 2003-2004 when it declined to roughly 0.120 million. In 
2000, however, the total number of immigrants was almost twice as high (0.359 
million), but already the next year it dropped to its current level. 
Overall, according to the Russian State Statistical Agency, there were 1.014 
million legally employed foreign nationals in Russia in 2006 (see Table 4.3), up 
from 0.7025 million a year earlier and 0.213 million in 2000. The largest sources 
of foreign workers in Russia, according to that data, were China (0.2108 million), 
Ukraine (0.1713), Uzbekistan (0.1051 million), Turkey (0.1014 million), and Taji-
kistan (0.0987 million). Overall, over half of all foreign workers arrived from the 
CIS countries (0.5377 million). Foreign workers are predominantly male (0.8585 
million in 2006), while women account for only a small fraction of the total (0.156 
million). The single most popular destination for immigrant workers is the con-
struction industry employing 0.4141 million foreign workers in 2006 up from 
0.2721 a year earlier. Next comes the retail and wholesale trade (including repair 
services) with 0.2709 million foreign workers. Agriculture and transportation em-
ploy over 40 thousand foreigners each, while “other services” employ less than 30 
thousand. The presence of foreign workers in other industries is marginal. Nearly 
half of all foreign workers are concentrated in Moscow. 
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Table 4.1 Inflow of migrants into Russia (number of people) 
  1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 597651 359330 193450 184612 129144 119157 177230 186380 
CIS countries 571903 346774 183650 175068 119661 110374 168598 177657 
Azerbaijan  29878 14906 5587 5635 4277 2584 4600 8900 
Armenia  19123 15951 5814 6802 5124 3057 7581 12949 
Belarus 17575 10274 6520 6841 5309 5650 6797 5619 
Georgia  24517 20213 9674 7128 5540 4886 5497 6806 
Kazakhstan  235903 124903 65226 55706 29552 40150 51945 38606 
Kyrgyzstan  13752 15536 10740 13139 6948 9511 15592 15669 
Moldova  13750 11652 7569 7562 6391 4816 6569 8649 
Tajikistan  23053 11043 6742 5967 5346 3339 4717 6523 
Turkmenistan  16501 6738 4402 4531 6299 3734 4104 4089 
Uzbekistan  39620 40810 24873 24951 21457 14948 30436 37126 
Ukraine  138231 74748 36503 36806 23418 17699 30760 32721 
Non-CIS coun-
tries 25748 12556 9800 9544 9483 8783 8632 8723 
Australia  57 27 25 22 30 42 30 28 
Afghanistan  208 288 171 107 82 55 60 86 
Bulgaria  750 245 255 238 212 125 118 109 
Germany  2379 1753 1627 1962 2692 3117 3025 2900 
Greece  183 182 124 150 224 182 200 176 
Israel  1626 1508 1373 1670 1808 1486 1004 1053 
Canada  73 50 74 70 103 87 99 77 
China  2861 1121 405 410 346 212 432 499 
Cuba  110 37 42 22 23 12 17 12 
Latvia  5658 1785 1283 990 906 819 726 766 
Lithuania  1785 945 758 722 535 339 360 371 
Poland  247 61 56 53 39 48 55 48 
Syria  483 358 260 144 101 56 68 67 
USA  668 439 432 455 484 518 396 411 
Turkey  176 164 184 144 112 77 86 172 
Finland  140 83 97 136 125 141 129 137 
Sweden  32 14 28 19 22 16 23 32 
Estonia  3483 786 535 534 445 446 432 347 
Other  4829 2710 2071 1696 1194 1005 1372 1432 
Source: Table 5.9. International Migration, “Russia in Figures 2007”, Russian State Statis-
tical Agency 
 
Table 4.2 Outflow of migrants from Russia (number of people) 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 232987 145720 121166 106685 94018 79795 69798 54061 
CIS countries 146961 82312 61570 52099 46081 37017 36109 35262 
Azerbaijan 4302 3187 2170 1704 1771 1336 1274 1366 
Armenia 2578 1519 1362 1114 1098 654 620 686 
Belarus 18928 13276 11175 8829 7016 5671 6034 6318 
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 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Georgia 3286 1802 1339 964 939 740 691 593 
Kazakhstan 25364 17913 15186 13939 14017 12504 12437 11948 
Kyrgyzstan 6296 1857 1333 1080 959 656 473 605 
Moldova 5715 2237 1660 1385 1234 907 786 636 
Tajikistan 2474 1158 993 827 922 549 434 424 
Turkmenistan 1532 676 352 272 251 168 125 112 
Uzbekistan 7370 3086 1974 1400 1130 717 595 648 
Ukraine 69116 35601 24026 20585 16744 13115 12640 11926 
Non-CIS coun-
tries 86026 63408 59596 54586 47937 42778 33689 18799 
Australia 297 176 184 144 146 167 209 167 
Afghanistan 146 25 18 7 17 2 11 11 
Bulgaria 668 180 163 133 156 160 124 116 
Germany 48363 40443 43682 42231 36928 31876 21458 8229 
Greece 886 314 204 190 186 157 155 139 
Israel 12873 9407 4835 2764 2048 1733 1745 1408 
Canada 1333 841 812 725 701 783 628 552 
China 1222 658 156 151 86 154 456 196 
Cuba 89 27 15 6 8 8 2 3 
Latvia 636 365 311 256 259 226 211 223 
Lithuania 1162 376 262 293 268 282 213 228 
Poland 376 135 84 80 72 57 76 84 
Syria 256 54 60 66 58 55 54 42 
USA 9087 4793 4527 3134 3199 2919 4040 3109 
Turkey 356 104 96 80 88 60 85 78 
Finland 923 1142 980 1110 737 910 737 695 
Sweden 151 195 148 162 151 158 110 132 
Estonia 702 385 402 321 351 265 225 270 
other 6500 3788 2657 2733 2478 2806 3150 3117 
Source: Table 5.9. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, “Russia in Figures 2007”,  Russian  
State Statistical Agency. 
 
This official data on “registered migration,” however, seems to significantly un-
derestimate the volume of migration flows, especially the volume of short-term mi-
gration of low-skilled workers from the CIS countries. On the one hand, citizens of 
most of the CIS countries do not require visas to travel to Russia which encourages 
migration. On the other, the system of registration in force in Russia throughout the 
2000s was extremely burdensome. In order to obtain a registration an immigrant had 
to satisfy a number of conditions, most importantly, he had to have a place of resi-
dence and, moreover, to obtain a permission from his landlord to be registered at this 
particular address. The very fact of registration made a migrant (and his tax-evading 
landlord) “visible” and thus exposed him or her to extortion by the corrupt officials. 
Obtaining work permits was similarly burdensome. Employers also had all the in-
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centives to encourage illegal immigration, for it gave them significant leverage over 
their unregistered and thus legally vulnerable workers. 
 
Table 4.3. Number of foreign nationals employed in Russia (according to the Federal 
Migration service data (thsd people) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 213.3 283.7 359.5 377.9 460.4 702.5 1014.0 
Non-CIS countries 106.9 135.1 154.9 197.4 238.5 358.7 476.1 
Vietnam 13.3 20.1 26.7 35.2 41.8 55.6 69.1 
China  26.2 38.6 38.7 72.8 94.1 160.6 210.8 
North Korea 8.7 9.9 12.7 13.2 14.7 20.1 27.7 
USA 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.9 3.7 
Turkey 17.8 20.9 15.4 37.9 48.0 73.7 101.4 
From CIS countries 106.4 148.6 204.6 180.5 221.9 343.7 537.7 
Azerbaijan  3.3 4.4 15.0 6.0 9.8 17.3 28.3 
Armenia  5.5 8.5 12.6 10.0 17.0 26.2 39.8 
Georgia  5.2 5.0 6.8 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.9 
Kazakhstan  2.9 3.6 7.6 4.0 4.3 4.1 5.0 
Kyrgyzstan  0.9 1.7 6.4 4.8 8.0 16.2 33.0 
Moldova  11.9 13.3 40.7 21.5 22.7 30.6 51.0 
Tajikistan  6.2 10.0 16.8 13.6 23.3 52.6 98.7 
Turkmenistan  0.2 0.1 7.0 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.7 
Uzbekistan  6.1 10.1 15.5 14.6 24.1 49.0 105.1 
Ukraine  64.1 91.9 61.0 102.6 108.6 141.8 171.3 
Source: Russian State Statistical Agency. 
 
As a result, even the authorities themselves acknowledge the presence of a 
huge number of illegal immigrants. The magnitude of illegal migration is also 
underlined by the fact that after the registration procedure was reformed in 2007 
(now foreigners don’t need to ask the officials for registration, it is enough for 
them to simply notify the authorities about their new place of residence) the num-
ber of foreigners registering with the Federal Migration Service jumped, according 
to some accounts, threefold. Still, it is hard to get a reasonable estimate of the vol-
ume of migration. At the end of 2006 the head of the Federal Migration Service 
estimated the number of illegal immigrants in Russia at 10 million, while the 
United Nations Population Division (World Migrant Stock) estimated the number 
of international migrants in Russia at mid-year (both sexes) in 2005 at 12 million, 
about 6 million of them female; this number, according to the UN Population Di-
vision holds roughly constant throughout 1990s-2000s. However, independent 
experts in Russia criticize these estimates as overblown. According to the esti-
mates by the Centre for Migration Studies in Moscow, the stock of immigrants 
present in Russia at a given moment is about 7 million. Roughly 0.5 million for 
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them are expatriate workers from the developed countries, while 5 to 6 million are 
“migrant labor.” No more than 0.7 million of them come through official channels, 
while the rest arrive on their own. Among these about 20% follow the necessary 
legal procedures obtaining both registration and work permit, 30% register, but work 
without permit, and the rest (i.e. 50%) have neither registration nor permit (these 
estimates describe the situation before the 2007 reform of registration system). 
 
Table 4.4. Foreign nationals employed, by sector (Federal Migration Service data) 
  Thousand people Percentage of the total by occupation 
  2005 2006 2005 2006 
Total 702.5 1014.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture and hunting 33.4 44.1 4.8 4.4 
Forestry 17.8 28.5 2.5 2.8 
Fishing, fish farms 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.1 
Mining and quarrying 12.6 19.9 1.8 2.0 
Manufacturing 48.7 72.2 6.9 7.1 
Construction 272.1 414.1 38.7 40.8 
Wholesale trade and commission trade; 
repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles; 
personal and household goods   
213.9 270.9 30.4 26.7 
Transport  29.5 43.3 4.2 4.3 
Communication 3.5 3.7 0.5 0.4 
Financial intermediation 1.9 4.2 0.3 0.4 
Real estate, renting and business activi-
ties 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 
Computer-related activities 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Science and research 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Geophysical, geological exploration 3.1 2.3 0.4 0.2 
Land-surveying and cartographic activi-
ties 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Education 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 
Health and social work 2.2 2.8 0.3 0.3 
Other community, social and personal 
service activities 13.6 24.1 1.9 2.4 
Other activities 46.8 79.0 6.7 7.8 
Source: “Russia in Figures 2007”, Russian  State Statistical Agency. 
 
Official data on emigration from Russia should also be treated cautiously, for it 
accounts only for those who have chosen to register with the Russian authorities as 
residing or working abroad; however, citizens have no incentives to do so, not 
there are any enforcement mechanisms. With all that said, the number of depar-
tures from Russia in 2006 is officially put at 54,061, with 35,262 among them 
going to the CIS countries. This is a marked decrease compared to the level of 
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2000 (145,720). Top destinations include Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Germany, and 
USA. However, the official data on the number of Russians that left the country in 
2006 in order to work abroad is put at 65,747. 
 
Table 4.5. Stock of migrants according to WB Migration and Remittances Fact book 
Russian Federation ( Europe & Central Asia;  Upper middle income) 
Population (millions, 2006) 142 Surface area (1,000 sq. km, 2006) 17098 
Population growth (avg. annual %, 
1997–2006) -0.4 GNI ($ billions, 2006) 958 
Population density (people per sq. 
km, 2006) 9 
GNI per capita, Atlas method ($, 
2006) 5780 
Labour force (millions, 2006) 73 GDP growth (avg. annual %, 2002–2006) 7 
Urban population (% of pop., 2006) 72.9 
Age dependency ratio 0.4 
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line (% of pop., 2004) 0 
Emigration, 2005 
Stock of emigrants 11,480,137 
Stock of emigrants as percentage of population: 8.0% 
Top 10 destination countries: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Israel, Uzbekistan, United 
States, Latvia, Germany, Moldova, Estonia. 
Skilled Emigration, 2000 
Emigration rate of tertiary educated 1.3% 
Emigration of physicians 
as % of physicians trained in the country 
1,875 
0.3% 
Immigration, 2005 
Stock of immigrants 12,079,626 
Stock of immigrants as percentage of population 8.4% 
Female as percentage of immigrants 57.8% 
Refugees as percentage of immigrants 0.0% 
Top 10 source countries: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Moldova 
Source: Migration and Remittances Factbook is compiled by Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu, 
Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, World Bank. More in-
formation on other countries and regions are available at 
www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. 
 
There is increasing attention on international migrant remittances as a devel-
opment policy and financial stability issue. Official statistics on remittances are 
primarily collected and reported through the balance of payments statistics, but 
they are incomplete in many countries, may underreport remittance flows, and are 
often not comparable15. 
                                                 
15 IMF Remittances Statistics portal (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/remitt.htm). 
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The primary source of information about trans-border money transfers, includ-
ing remittances is the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). According to the CBR16 total 
money transfers to Russia amounted to US$ 7,500 million in 2006, with most of 
the funds transferred in favor of residents - 66% (US$ 5.0 billion) compared with 
55% (US$ 3.5 billion) in 2005. Total outward money transfers were estimated at 
US$ 18,800 million in 2006. 
Cross-border remittances via money transfer systems accounted for 32% of 
outward money transfers from Russia in 2006 (28% in 2005) and for 17% of in-
ward money transfers to Russia (16% in 2005). 
The flow of remittances via money transfer systems has risen considerably in 
the past few years. It amounted to US$ 7.3 billion in 2006. Between 2003 and 
2006, the volume of remittances grew at an annual rate of 150-160%. The high 
growth rate was largely maintained by remittances from Russia. 
The value of remittances from Russia increased by 69% in 2006 on annual ba-
sis up to US$ 6.0 billion. Compared with 2004, they grew by 190%. Remittances 
to Russia grew slower. Their value increased by 25% in 2006 on a year-to-year 
basis up to US$ 1.3 billion. Compared with 2004, they grew by 68% (Table 4.6). 
The CIS countries accounted for most of remittances from Russia in 2006 
(90%). Their value totaled $5.4 billion. Money transfers to Russia came both from 
non-CIS countries (US$ 0.7 billion) and CIS countries (US$ 0.6 billion) in 2006. 
The average sum of one remittance from Russia increased by 19% in 2006 
(comparing to 2005) to US$ 546 per transaction. The average remittance to non-
CIS countries was twice as much as the sum of one remittance to CIS countries 
(US$ 1,349 and US$ 511, respectively). 
In 2006, Uzbekistan (16.7%), Tajikistan (15.9%), Ukraine (15.4%), Armenia 
(10.1%) and Moldova (8.7%) were the main recipients of money remittances from 
Russia carried out via money transfer systems. Ukraine registered the smallest 
average remittance (US$ 364) from Russia. 
The main remitting countries were the United States (14.6%), Kazakhstan 
(11.8%), Uzbekistan (7.0%), Ukraine (6.8%) and Germany (4.8%). 
The geography of inward remittances was wider than that of outward remit-
tances. In 2006, the top three remitting countries contributed to one-third of money 
received in Russia whereas the top three recipient countries accounted for almost 
50% of remittances from Russia. 
 
                                                 
16 http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/CrossBorder/Cross-border_06_e.pdf. 
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Table 4.6. Remittances according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total, $ million 
Money Transfers from Individuals in 
the Russian Federation 1,310 2,070 3,549 6,005 9,444 
to non-CIS countries … … 323 622 868 
to CIS countries … … 3,226 5,382 8,575 
Money Transfers in favour of Indi-
viduals to the Russian Federation 588 777 1,041 1,304 1,681 
from non-CIS countries … … 645 746 813 
from CIS countries … … 396 559 868 
Balance … … -2,507 -4,700 -7,763 
with non-CIS countries … … 322 123 -55 
with CIS countries … … -2,829 -4,824 -7,707 
Average remittance, $ 
Money Transfers from Individuals in 
the Russian Federation … … 457 546 623 
to non-CIS countries … … 1,084 1,349 1,407 
to CIS countries … … 432 511 589 
Money Transfers in favour of Indi-
viduals to the Russian Federation … … 427 480 579 
from non-CIS countries … … 506 536 583 
from CIS countries … … 340 422 575 
Source: Cross-border Remittances via Money Transfer Systems Reports of the credit insti-
tutions "Data on Transfers of the Individuals from the Russian Federation and Transfers to 
the Russian Federation for the Benefit of the Individuals and Transactions of the Resident 
Individuals with the Non-residents on the Territory of the Russian Federation", other re-
ports of the credit institutions, reports of money transfer systems and of the government 
post service "Pochta Rossii". 
 
Remittances without quid pro quo17 accounted for 27% of money transfers from 
abroad in favor of individuals in 2006. Their value increased by 29% (US$ 0.3 
billion) to US$ 1.4 billion in 2006. 80% (US$ 1.1 billion) of this amount was 
channeled via money transfer systems. Transfers in favor of non-residents totaled 
$2.5 billion in 2006 compared with US$ 2.9 billion in 2005. Their share in the 
structure of transfers dropped from 45% in 2005 to 34% in 2006. 
As for the country profile of money transfers, Kazakhstan was the only CIS 
country, which remitted more funds to Russia than it received. The transfer of 
money from the sale of property by migrants leaving Kazakhstan for permanent 
residence in Russia played a noticeable role in this balance. 
                                                 
17 Remittances without quid pro quo include grants, donations, compensation payments, 
scholarships, pensions, alimonies, inheritance payments, gifts, and also all remittances 
made via money transfer systems. 
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The largest amount of money transfers from Russia went to China (US$ 2.5 bil-
lion) compared with other countries. These operations were largely conducted by 
non-residents. In terms of value, they accounted for one-third of all money trans-
fers by non-residents from Russia. The average transaction was relatively large 
and equaled about US$ 20,000, exceeding by 30 times the amount of one money 
transfer by a non-resident from Russia to CIS countries. Over 60% of these trans-
actions were performed by non-resident individuals from the Far Eastern and Urals 
Federal Districts of Russia, with the average size of a transaction equaling US$ 
50,000. According to estimates, these transactions are related to payments for 
goods imported into Russia without proper customs clearance rather than to remit-
tances without quid pro quo. 
More than half of money transfers to Turkey were made by residents. Payments 
for the import of consumer goods and the services of travel agencies accounted for 
one-third of that amount. According to the CBR estimates, remittances by non-
residents to Turkey largely included the transfer of part of wages received by 
Turkish citizens working in Russia to their families. 
Among ten main recipient countries, the largest average transfer went to Swit-
zerland (US$ 22,071) and the United Kingdom (US$ 26,256) while the smallest 
sums went to CIS countries: Ukraine ($491), Uzbekistan ($666), Tajikistan ($648) 
and Armenia ($754). According to CBR estimates, money transfers to the first 
group of countries were related to transactions conducted by residents from their 
accounts with Russian banks to their accounts with foreign banks. Meanwhile, 
transfers to the second group of countries were linked to transactions carried out 
by individuals temporarily working in Russia. An average transaction was larger 
in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than in Ukraine because money was consolidated by 
one trusted person. 
According to CBR estimates, the average fee per remittance abroad via money 
transfer systems was 3.7% of the remittance sum in 2006 (Figure 4.1). At the same 
time, the average fee was $20 for the average remittance of $500-$600. The size of 
remittance fee has decreased considerably in the past few years. The largest reduc-
tion was registered for remittances ranging from $100 to $200. In 2006, the remit-
tance fee fell 7% on average compared with 2005 and 13% compared with 2004. 
According to Word Bank estimates, the volume of inward remittance flow to 
Russia in 2006 was US$ 3,091 million, with the stock of emigrants estimated at 
11.5 million. As one can see WB’s estimates are twice as big as CBR’s are. This is 
the case of inconsistency in statistical methods or incorrect terminology. CBR’s 
figures on remittances include only personal trans-border transfers, contrary to the 
WB methodology which includes trans-border compensation of employees. 
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Figure 4.1. Average Fee for Remittances from Russia via Money Transfer Systems 
(% of remittance) 
 
Source: CBR’s survey of cross-border transactions of individuals: 
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/CrossBorder/Cross-border_06_e.pdf.  
 
The volume of remittances sent home by foreign workers in Russia is estimated 
by the World Bank (Migration and Remittances Factbook) at US$ 11,436 million 
(2006), or 11.2% of GDP, of which US$ 4,587 million are workers’ remittances, 
and US$ 6,038 million is defined as compensation of employees. The volume of 
remittances in 2006 increased sharply compared to the previous year ($6,989) and 
even more so, compared to 2000 (US$ 1,101 million). These estimates are made 
on the assumption that the stock of immigrants in Russia in 2005 was 12 million, 
as estimated by the UN Population Division. 
Statistical base for social accounting matrices (SAM) in Russia is a “System of 
Input-output tables of Russia” published by Goskomstat. The last publication con-
tains 2003 data. In order to build a Russian SAM for 2004 we had to update data 
using the available information from the National Accounts and Russian Statistical 
Yearbook for 2004. Structure of this database is close to the data requirements for 
the standard IFPRI model (Lofgren et al. 2002), with one exception: there is no 
data on transport and trade mark-ups. 
 
4.2. Experiment design 
 
Designing experiments for this model we kept in mind two possible channels of 
influence of an increase in migration on Russian economy: a direct one, account-
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ing for a hypothetic increase in immigration; and an indirect one, steaming from 
an increase in total factor productivity in selected industries which are usual em-
ployers of immigrants. 
We conducted three series of simulations, exploring direct and indirect effects 
of an increase in migration. In the first series consisting of ten experiments, we 
look at direct consequences of a 10% increase in migration and remittances rela-
tive to a previous simulation. Thus in the last simulation a cumulative increase 
relative to the benchmark is two-fold. The GAMS code and some additional in-
formation on the design of the first set of simulations are in the Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7. Design of the first set of simulations, an increase in immigration and remit-
tances 
GAMS CODE: Experiment 1 
Parameter SHRMIGR /0.14/; 
trnsfrSIM(H,SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = (1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10) *  trnsfr(H,'ROW'); 
QFSSIM('LAB',SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = ((1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10)*SHRMIGR + (1-
SHRMIGR)) * QFS0('LAB'); 
In each simulation households transfers to ROW  (interpreted as remittances) and stock 
of immigrants in labour force increase by 1% relative to previous simulation. A first 
simulation is equivalent to benchmark. Migration and remittances increase twofold in last 
simulation relative to benchmark. 
Total labour force, thousand people  
(Source: Таблица 1.11.; ТРУД И ЗАНЯТОСТЬ В РОССИИ 2007) 74 146 200.00 
Stock of immigrants (2005)  
(Source: WB Migration and Remittances Factbook )  12 079 626.00 
Share of migrants in the total labour force (SHRMIGR) 14% 
 
We assume that the share of remittances in the labor income of immigrants is 
constant. Thus the volume of remittances in local currency units (LCU) increases 
by the same factor as immigration does. 
The second set of simulations aims at assessing indirect effects of increasing 
migration. According to Table 4.4 most officially registered immigrants are em-
ployed in construction (40% in 2006), trade (26%), transport (4.3%), agriculture 
and hunting (4.4%). We enlarged this list to cover all service sectors of the model. 
Indirect effect of an increase in migration is modeled as an increase in total factor 
productivity in service sector. In the second set of experiments we conducted ten 
runs. In each run total factor productivity in services increases by 5% relative to a 
previous experiment. 
The GAMS code and some additional information on the design of the second 
set of simulations are in the Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8. Design of the second set of simulations, an assessment of an indirect effects 
of an increase in migration (an increase in TFP in services) 
alphavaSIM(AASERV,SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = (1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/20) * al-
phava0(AASERV);   
 AASERV(A) services 
/ 
A_sec14        Construction 
A_sec16        Transport and communication 
A_sec17        Trade 
A_sec18        Other services 
A_sec19        Housing 
A_sec20        Health  sports  social security  education  culture and arts services 
A_sec21        Science 
A_sec22        Finance  administration  defense and civil organizations 
/ 
In each simulation total factor productivity in services increases by 5% 
 
Table 4.9. Parameter alphavaSIM – a shift parameter in CES activity production 
function, by industry for each simulation of the second set 
3304 PARAMETER al-
phavaSIM shift parameter 
CES activity production 
function 
Bench
-mark 
level 
SIM
2 
SIM
3 
SIM 
4 
SIM
5 
SIM
6 
SIM
7 
SIM
8 
SIM
9 
SIM 
10 
SIM 
11 
A_sec1 Electricity and heat 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 
A_sec2 
Products of Oil 
extraction and 
refinery 
1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 
A_sec3 Coal 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 
A_sec4 Peat 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 1.998 
A_sec5 Ferrous metals  1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.741 
A_sec6 Nonferrous metals 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 1.821 
A_sec7 
Products of 
Chemical industry 
and petrochemical 
industry 
1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 1.989 
A_sec8 
Machinery and 
equipment, metal 
works  
1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 1.827 
A_sec9 
Products of For-
estry, wood-
processing and 
paper-pulp indus-
try  
1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
A_sec10 
Construction 
materials (includ-
ing glass, china 
and delftware) 
1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 1.901 
A_sec11 Products of Light industry  1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 1.952 
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3304 PARAMETER al-
phavaSIM shift parameter 
CES activity production 
function 
Bench
-mark 
level 
SIM
2 
SIM
3 
SIM
4 
SIM
5 
SIM
6 
SIM
7 
SIM
8 
SIM 
9 
SIM 
10 
SIM 
11 
A_sec12 
Products of Food-
processing Indus-
try  
1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 1.867 
A_sec13 Products of all Other industries  1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 1.871 
A_sec14 Construction goods 1.973 2.072 2.171 2.269 2.368 2.467 2.565 2.664 2.763 2.861 2.96 
A_sec15 
Agricultural goods 
and services in 
agriculture and 
forestry  
1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.577 
A_sec16 
Transport cargo 
and 
communication  
1.999 2.098 2.198 2.298 2.398 2.498 2.598 2.698 2.798 2.898 2.998 
A_sec17 Trade (including catering) 1.338 1.405 1.472 1.539 1.606 1.673 1.74 1.807 1.874 1.941 2.007 
A_sec18 Other services 1.877 1.971 2.064 2.158 2.252 2.346 2.44 2.534 2.628 2.721 2.815 
A_sec19 Housing 1.918 2.014 2.11 2.206 2.302 2.398 2.494 2.59 2.686 2.782 2.878 
A_sec20 
Health, sports, 
social security, 
education, culture 
and arts services 
1.206 1.266 1.327 1.387 1.447 1.508 1.568 1.628 1.689 1.749 1.809 
A_sec21 
Science and scien-
tific services, 
including geology 
and meteorology 
services 
1.017 1.068 1.118 1.169 1.22 1.271 1.322 1.373 1.423 1.474 1.525 
A_sec22 
Finance, banking 
and insurance 
services, govern-
ment and civil 
organizations 
1.768 1.856 1.944 2.033 2.121 2.21 2.298 2.386 2.475 2.563 2.651 
 
The third set of experiments (Table 4.10) combines design of the first and the 
second sets, i.e. in each experiment of this set there is an increase in labor immi-
gration, remittances, and TFP in services. 
 
Table 4.10. Design of the third set of simulations 
Parameter SHRMIGR /0.14/; 
 trnsfrSIM(H,SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = (1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10) *  trnsfr(H,'ROW'); 
 QFSSIM('LAB',SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = ((1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10)*SHRMIGR + (1-
SHRMIGR)) * QFS0('LAB'); 
* Increase in productivity in service sectors 
alphavaSIM(AASERV,SIMNTBASE(SIM))=(1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/20) * alphava0(AASERV); 
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AASERV(A) services 
/ 
A_sec14        Construction 
A_sec16        Transport and communication 
A_sec17        Trade 
A_sec18        Other services 
A_sec19        Housing 
A_sec20        Health  sports  social security  education  culture and arts services 
This is a combination of the set of simulations 1 and the set of simulations 2: In each 
simulation households transfers to ROW  (interpreted as remittances) and stock of immi-
grants in labour force increase by 10% relative to previous simulation. First simulation is 
equivalent to benchmark. Migration and remittances increase twofold in last simulation 
relative to benchmark. In each simulation total factor productivity in services (set 
AASERV) increases by 0.05% 
 Simulation number (The first set of simulations) 
Parameter 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Capital rent (% 
to benchmark) 0.31 0.62 0.92 1.21 1.49 1.77 2.04 2.31 2.57 2.82 
Wage (% to 
benchmark) -0.31 -0.62 -0.92 -1.21 -1.49 -1.77 -2.04 -2.31 -2.57 -2.82 
 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Comparing results of all simulations we can conclude that both, direct and indi-
rect effects are working in the same direction. As for numerical values, the indirect 
effect of migration, as it is modeled in the second set, dominates the direct effect 
of an increase in immigration and remittances. 
Experiment 1: doubling the stock of immigrants and remittances  
The consequences of an increase in the labor migration in the model could be 
characterized in the following way: as inward labor migration increases, supply of 
labor increases for all industries, since we do not have any labor market segmenta-
tion in the model. The present model set-up does not account for unemployment, 
either. Thus increase in the labor force pushes wages down in the whole economy. 
With the supply of capital being fixed, capital rent rises as wage goes down (see 
Table 4.11 for details). 
We used the standard macro closure of the IFPRI model for all three sets of 
simulations. In this closure a country under investigation is assumed to be a small 
open economy with flexible exchange rate, fixed foreign savings and fixed capital 
formation.  
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Table 4.11. Results of the first set of simulations 
Percentage increase of LF and remittances 
relative to benchmark. Experiment 1 
Description of a 
parmeter 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
QABSTOT real absorption (LCU at base prices) 0.54 1.06 1.57 2.07 2.56 3.04 3.51 3.97 4.41 4.85 
QHTOT 
real household con-
sumption (LCU at 
base prices) 
1.14 2.25 3.34 4.4 5.44 6.46 7.45 8.43 9.38 10.3 
QETOT total real exports (LCU at base prices) 0.54 1.07 1.6 2.12 2.64 3.15 3.66 4.17 4.67 5.17 
QMTOT total real imports (LCU at base prices) 0.52 1.03 1.53 2.02 2.51 2.98 3.45 3.9 4.35 4.8 
REXR PPP real exchange rate (LCUs per FCU) 0.25 0.49 0.72 0.94 1.16 1.37 1.57 1.77 1.96 2.15 
NEXR nominal exchange rate (LCUs per FCU) 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 
PDIND 
domestic (non-
tradables) price index 
(100 for base) 
-0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1 -1.2 -1.4 -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 
INVGDP investment (% of nominal GDP) -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1 
PRVSAVGDP 
private (household + 
enterprise) savings (% 
of nominal GDP) 
-0.5 -0.9 -1.3 -1.7 -2.2 -2.5 -2.9 -3.3 -3.7 -4 
FORSAVGDP foreign savings (% of nominal GDP) 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.39 
TRDDEFGDP trade deficit (% of nominal GDP) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
GOVSAVGDP government savings (% of nominal GDP) 0.3 0.59 0.87 1.14 1.4 1.66 1.9 2.14 2.38 2.61 
IMPTAXGDP tariff revenue (% of nominal GDP) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
DIRTAXGDP direct tax revenue (% of nominal GDP) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.1 
 
The wage decrease drives domestic prices down and stimulates exports. Price 
ratio of tradables to nontradables goes up, as real and nominal exchange rate de-
preciate. Import is part of an aggregate commodity which is demanded by house-
holds and government for final consumption and by firms for intermediate use (see 
Figure 4.2 below.) 
Thus increase in volume of production gives rise to intermediate use and de-
mand for composite commodity. In a due course, this tendency gives rise to im-
ports. 
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Figure 4.2. Commodity flows in the standard Ifpri model (Longfren et al, 2002) 
 
Note. CES is constant elasticity of substitution, CET is constant elasticity of transforma-
tion. 
 
There is only one household in our version of the model. Thus we can not dif-
ferentiate between residents of the country and labor migrants. An increase in mi-
gration affects the income of the representative household in two ways. First, the 
wage rate declines, but the labor force increases. Second, households are assumed 
to be the owners of the capital, thus all capital rent goes to the household budget. 
With an increasing labor force and declining wage rate, plus an increase in capital 
rent, household income increases as a result of an increase in immigration. An 
increase in household income and a decrease in domestic prices give rise in private 
consumption in all three sets of simulations. 
Experiment 2: increasing total factor productivity in services 
The indirect effects of immigration through higher TFP in services, as they are 
modeled in the second experiment, are much larger than the effects of immigra-
tion-induced increase in the labor force (cf. Experiment 1). For example, with a 
hypothetical 10 percent increase in TFP in services, total absorption increases by 8 
percent and household consumption by 16 percent (vs. 1 percent and 2 percent, 
respectively, in Experiment 1). While it is difficult to establish a tight quantitative 
link between immigration and higher TFP in services, it is clear that the impact of 
any significant productivity gains would be large compared to the more conven-
tional effects assessed in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3: doubling the stock of immigrants and increasing total factor 
productivity in services 
Experiment 3 combines the immigration-induced increase of the labor force 
and outward remittances (as in Experiment 1) with the TFP increase in the services 
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sector (as in Experiment 2). The results are unsurprising, with labor force and TFP 
effects generally working in the same direction and adding to each other. 
 
Table 4.12. Results of the second set of simulations 
Experi 
ment 2 
Description of a 
parmeter 
SIM
2 
SIM
3 
SIM
4 
SIM
5 
SIM
6 
SIM
7 
SIM
8 
SIM
9 
SIM1
0 
SIM 
11 
QABSTOT 
real absorption 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
3.92 7.74 11.46 15.09 18.64 22.12 25.53 28.88 32.17 35.4 
QHTOT 
real household 
consumption 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
8.34 16.45 24.35 32.06 39.61 47 54.25 61.36 68.34 75.21 
QETOT 
total real exports 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
2.17 4.29 6.38 8.44 10.48 12.5 14.51 16.5 18.47 20.44 
QMTOT 
total real imports 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
4.13 8.17 12.14 16.06 19.93 23.76 27.56 31.33 35.07 38.79 
REXR 
PPP real exchange 
rate (LCUs per 
FCU) 
0.93 1.63 2.11 2.4 2.52 2.48 2.32 2.06 1.69 1.26 
NEXR 
nominal exchange 
rate (LCUs per 
FCU) 
0.96 1.74 2.35 2.82 3.14 3.35 3.46 3.46 3.39 3.25 
PDIND 
domestic (non-
tradables) price 
index (100 for 
base) 
0.02 0.1 0.24 0.41 0.61 0.85 1.1 1.38 1.67 1.97 
INVGDP investment (% of nominal GDP) -0.61 -1.17 -1.68 -2.15 -2.59 -2.99 -3.36 -3.71 -4.03 -4.34 
PRVSAVG
DP 
private (household 
+ enterprise) 
savings (% of 
nominal GDP) 
-2.25 -4.3 -6.19 -7.93 -9.54 -11.1 -12.5 -13.8 -14.99 -16.15 
FORSAVG
DP 
foreign savings 
(% of nominal 
GDP) 
0.32 0.63 0.94 1.25 1.55 1.84 2.12 2.4 2.67 2.93 
TRDDEFG
DP 
trade deficit (% of 
nominal GDP) 0.39 0.77 1.14 1.5 1.85 2.19 2.52 2.84 3.15 3.45 
GOVSAVG
DP 
government sav-
ings (% of nomi-
nal GDP) 
1.31 2.49 3.56 4.53 5.41 6.22 6.97 7.65 8.29 8.88 
IMPTAXG
DP 
tariff revenue (% 
of nominal GDP) 0.05 0.1 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.32 0.34 
DIRTAXG
DP 
direct tax revenue 
(% of nominal 
GDP) 
0.14 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.59 0.68 0.77 0.85 0.93 1 
Atamanov, Luecke, Mahmoud, Mogilevsky, Tereshchenko, Tourdyeva, Uzagalieva, Vavryshchuk 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 86 64 
Table 4.13. Results of the third set of simulations 
Experiment 
3 
Description of a 
parmeter 
SIM
2 
SIM
3 
SIM
4 
SIM
5 
SIM
6 
SIM
7 
SIM
8 
SIM
9 
SIM1
0 
SIM 
11 
QABSTOT 
real absorption 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
4.47 8.83 13.1 17.29 21.4 25.45 29.44 33.36 37.24 41.06 
QHTOT 
real household 
consumption 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
9.49 18.76 27.83 36.73 45.47 54.07 62.53 70.88 79.11 87.24 
QETOT 
total real exports 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
2.71 5.38 8.02 10.63 13.22 15.8 18.37 20.92 23.46 25.99 
QMTOT 
total real imports 
(LCU at base 
prices) 
4.65 9.23 13.74 18.2 22.62 27.01 31.37 35.7 40.02 44.31 
REXR 
PPP real exchange 
rate (LCUs per 
FCU) 
1.17 2.06 2.72 3.17 3.44 3.54 3.52 3.38 3.15 2.84 
NEXR 
nominal exchange 
rate (LCUs per 
FCU) 
0.99 1.78 2.41 2.87 3.21 3.42 3.54 3.56 3.51 3.4 
PDIND 
domestic (non-
tradables) price 
index (100 for 
base) 
-0.18 -0.28 -0.31 -0.29 -0.22 -0.12 0.02 0.17 0.35 0.54 
INVGDP investment (% of nominal GDP) -0.73 -1.39 -1.99 -2.55 -3.07 -3.55 -4 -4.41 -4.8 -5.17 
PRVSAVG
DP 
private (household 
+ enterprise) 
savings (% of 
nominal GDP) 
-2.68 -5.12 -7.36 -9.41 -11.3 -13.1 -14.7 -16.2 -17.6 -19 
FOR-
SAVGDP 
foreign savings (% 
of nominal GDP) 0.36 0.72 1.07 1.42 1.76 2.09 2.41 2.72 3.02 3.31 
TRDDEFG
DP 
trade deficit (% of 
nominal GDP) 0.35 0.69 1.02 1.35 1.66 1.97 2.27 2.56 2.84 3.11 
GOVSAVG
DP 
government sav-
ings (% of nomi-
nal GDP) 
1.59 3.01 4.29 5.44 6.48 7.43 8.29 9.08 9.81 10.49 
IMP-
TAXGDP 
tariff revenue (% 
of nominal GDP) 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.2 0.23 0.27 0.3 0.32 0.35 0.37 
DIR-
TAXGDP 
direct tax revenue 
(% of nominal 
GDP) 
0.15 0.29 0.41 0.53 0.64 0.74 0.83 0.92 1 1.07 
 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
 
In this country study we analyzed direct and indirect consequences of increase 
in migration to Russia using standard IFPRI computable general equilibrium 
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framework. The benchmark CGE dataset – the social accounting matrix for Russia 
is unique and was created for this project. We presented a report on data availabil-
ity on migration and remittances for the Russian economy. We presented three sets 
of CGE model runs simulating direct and indirect effects of immigration.  
The most important driving force behind all results in the presented sets of 
simulations is a significant economy-wide wage rate decrease as a direct conse-
quence of an increase in immigration. This effect is justified by the model settings 
but is not supported by the mainstream empirical literature on immigration.  
From this literature we know the importance of personal characteristics, such as 
skill level, experience, major occupation, etc. General equilibrium analysis would 
be much more precise and rich with all these details incorporated in the model. 
This exercise could be done if there were empirical estimates of the relevant pa-
rameters for Russia. But empirical literature on the consequences of labor migra-
tion for Russia is constrained by the availability of data, which is very scarce to 
say the least. 
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5. Conclusions 
Our case studies of the impact of labor migration and remittances in several net 
emigrant countries and in Russia aim to provide a systematic comparative analy-
sis, notwithstanding inevitable concerns about data quality and restrictive model-
ing assumptions. With this qualification, our simulation results demonstrate that in 
all net immigrant countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), private 
consumption is much higher than it would be in the absence of migration and re-
mittances. The simulated decline is between 18 percent for Ukraine and 32 percent 
for Moldova (where the share of migrants in the labor force and the ratio of remit-
tances to GDP is especially large). All income groups would be strongly affected, 
although the impact on the poorest groups varies across countries. All net emigra-
tion countries would also experience a modest real devaluation of below 3 percent 
and associated changes in sectoral output patterns.  
In Russia, which hosts most migrants from the net emigration CIS countries, 
immigration mainly leads to an economy-wide wage decline. Although this result 
is conditioned in part by our assumptions, particularly the comparative-static na-
ture of the CGE model with no additional capital investment in response to immi-
gration, it is plausible that a large increase in the number of immigrants as in Rus-
sia will limit real wage growth. At the same time, Russia has actively encouraged 
some immigrants, especially of Russian ethnic background, to settle in Russia 
permanently, with a view to compensating for some of the population decline that 
Russia is experiencing. It remains to be seen whether these policies will be modi-
fied in response to the end-2008 financial crisis and the consequent slow-down in 
GDP growth and construction activity in particular. 
These simulation results demonstrate the large benefits from labor migration 
and remittances for migrants themselves as well their home countries. Indirectly, 
at least, host countries such as Russia and the European Union will also benefit 
from higher incomes and greater economic security in their neighboring net emi-
gration countries. Whether these potential benefits are realized depends impor-
tantly on government policies related to migration in both, home and host coun-
tries. Against the backdrop of the migration-related policies currently pursued in 
the CIS region and in the EU, four major policy implications emerge.  
First, some CIS country governments faced with large migrant outflows have 
been reluctant, for political reasons, to even acknowledge that emigration is taking 
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place on a large scale. Consequently, they have failed to provide support services 
to migrants where such services would enhance the benefits from migration, limit 
the risks, and strengthen migrants’ attachment to their home country. Such ser-
vices include job placement into legal work abroad through official employment 
agencies, high-quality consular services for migrants abroad, advocacy with part-
ner governments for limited-term work opportunities for their residents, etc. The 
absence of such support has made migration more costly to households, without 
offering attractive alternatives, and alienated migrants from their home country. 
By contrast, a forward-looking policy strategy for home countries would be to 
support migrants where they are most at risk, such as when seeking employment 
and dealing with host country authorities. This would render it more likely that 
migrants would favorably consider employment or investment opportunities at 
home in the future. 
Second, for economic recovery to take hold in the smaller, natural-resource-
poor CIS countries, fixed investments need to be sustained and increased further. 
Remittances could help to pay for such investment. However, the business and 
investment climate in many of these countries is so poor that, currently, remit-
tances are only rarely used for productive investment. Government efforts to 
channel remittances into investment, which are debated in many CIS countries, 
will succeed only when all investors – migrants and non-migrants, politically well-
connected or not – can expect to receive an adequate return on productive invest-
ments that is not diminished by parasitic public institutions.  
Third, to promote social coherence in emigration countries, prudent govern-
ment policies are called for to ensure that the income gains due to migration are 
shared, to some degree at least, by all households. Taxes on remittances are usu-
ally considered counterproductive as income from legal employment is already 
taxed in the host country and, in any case, remittances might simply be driven 
underground. However, since many CIS country governments rely on taxes on 
imports (especially VAT, but also import duties) for much of their revenue, gov-
ernment revenue typically increases along with remittance-driven imports (which 
are bought over-proportionately by migrant households). The extra government 
revenue can be used to maintain public infrastructure, provide social services and 
education (including to the children of migrants left at home or with relatives), and 
provide targeted income support. 
Fourth, destination countries will increasingly find themselves competing not 
only for high-skilled migrants, but also for those willing to perform jobs that are 
otherwise difficult to fill (such as seasonal work in agriculture, construction, and 
social services). Russia, the most important host country for migrants from the CIS 
region, is currently offering legal employment on a fairly broad basis, but mi-
grants’ living conditions are frequently poor and harassment by authorities is en-
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demic. Extending legal residence and employment to a larger share of migrants 
already in Russia, and strengthening the rule of law and ensuring fair treatment for 
migrants by authorities, would help to attract the growing numbers of immigrants 
that Russia will want to rely on as its economic growth continues.  
In EU countries, legal employment opportunities for CIS country migrants are 
still severely limited but growing. Legalization programs in countries such as Italy 
and Portugal also create pockets of legal migrants that will probably become the 
hubs of migrant networks that will attract more family-based and other immigra-
tion from CIS countries in the future. It would be in the interest of both migrants 
and EU host countries to replace these haphazard legalizations with a forward-
looking strategy for admitting migrants with good job prospects in the EU. Since 
the EU functions as a single labor market, such programs should be coordinated at 
the EU rather than the national level. For the benefit of both, CIS countries and the 
EU, the deepening of bilateral relations under European Neighborhood Policy 
should include enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration. 
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